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How can lawmakers reduce the skyrocketing rate of gun deaths in the United
States? How can they stymie the spread of viral fake news stories designed to undermine our elections? Certain constitutionally protected activities—like owning a gun
or speaking online—can generate social harms. Yet when lawmakers enact regulations to reduce those harms, they are regularly struck down as unconstitutional. Indeed, the very laws designed to most aggressively reduce social harms—like total
criminal bans—are the least likely to be upheld. As a result, regulators appear stuck
with an unpleasant choice—regulate constitutionally or effectively, but not both.
This Article proposes a novel solution: Pigouvian taxation. A Pigouvian tax is
an economic tool whereby people are required to bear the social costs of their own
activity, rather than forcing others to do so. Pigouvian taxes can thread the needle
that traditional regulations have not, reducing serious social costs while respecting
constitutional protections of individual rights. This is because many constitutional
tests—for example, strict scrutiny’s “narrow tailoring” requirement—implicitly reflect the very kind of economic thinking on which Pigouvian taxes rely. In short,
constitutional doctrines protecting individual activity do not require society to implicitly subsidize such activity by absorbing any and all costs it generates. Legitimate social costs may be regulated. But regulations must maintain a careful proportionality between the constitutional burdens they impose and the social harms
they seek to eliminate. Pigouvian taxes, unlike traditional command-and-control
rules, are inherently well-suited to such tailoring. Thus, in areas where traditional
rules have been difficult or impossible to adequately tailor—like guns and speech—
Pigouvian taxation presents an important new regulatory tool.
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INTRODUCTION
Gun deaths are on the rise in the United States, recently
reaching levels not seen since the 1970s. 1 Fake news is spreading
like wildfire across social media, damaging reputations and confusing voters. 2 Constitutionally protected activity—like owning a
gun or speaking online—can generate important benefits, but it
can also cause serious social harm. And frequently, legislative attempts to avert these harms—or perceived harms 3—are struck
1F

2F

3F

1
John Gramlich, What the Data Says About Gun Deaths in the U.S., PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/ST7U-YMN3.
2
See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 211, 212 (2017).
3
The reality and severity of harm from certain constitutionally protected activities—like terminating a pregnancy—is contested. While I have personal views on such
questions, they are not part of this Article’s analysis. This Article is about the structural
relationship between individual constitutional rights and regulatory design. I therefore
take as granted the normative preferences of legislators from across the political spectrum,

2021]

The Pigouvian Constitution

1083

down as unconstitutional. The First Amendment prevents states
from imposing tort damages on newspapers that print grossly
negligent falsities about public officials. 4 The Second Amendment
forbids municipalities from banning the deadliest variety of firearm—handguns. 5 The list goes on.
As a result, policymakers and scholars often assume that only
second-rate solutions are available for avoiding social harms from
protected activities. The policies that seem most likely to survive
constitutional scrutiny are precisely those least likely to have the
desired effect. Consider again guns. After District of Columbia v.
Heller, 6 regulators retreated from advocating broad firearms
bans—a regulation applicable to every potential gun owner—to
advocating much more limited measures. 7 These proposals—
background checks, magazine size limits, or assault weapons
bans—can, by design, produce only small effects. Even if perfectly
enforced, they forbid activity comprising only a few small slices of
the social-cost pie. 8 One can tell the same story for other protected
activities. 9
This Article proposes a solution. Bringing economic analysis
to bear on questions of substantive constitutional law, it argues
that the apparent tension between effective regulation and constitutionality is not fundamental. Rather, it can often be resolved
using careful policy design. This is because, properly understood,
constitutional protections embody the kind of welfarist thinking
familiar to economists. Although the Constitution forbids certain
kinds of restrictions on protected activities, it does not grant citizens an unlimited license to harm others while engaging in those
activities. Put another way, the Constitution does not require that
society implicitly subsidize protected activities by absorbing any
and all social costs that those activities generate. On the contrary,
4F

5F

6F

7F

8F

9F

asking how those preferences can or cannot be enacted into policy. On occasion, substantive constitutional law will supply answers—or at least boundaries within which answers
might fall—to normative questions. For example, as discussed below, the Constitution’s
protection of abortion rights limits the range of legitimately regulable social costs. See
infra Part IV.D. Those limits do matter to the analysis.
4
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
5
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). By “deadliest,” I mean “used in by far the most shootings.” See
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
6
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7
Cheyenne Haslett & Samantha Sergi, Here’s Where the 2020 Democrats Stand on
Gun Control, ABC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/7YEL-WUQ5.
8
See infra notes 50–55.
9
See infra Part I.
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constitutional law regularly allows, under the right conditions,
regulations that reduce those costs. Consider tort liability for negligent shootings or for fraudulent speech. 10
Based on this limiting principle of constitutional protection,
this Article suggests a promising new tool for regulating protected
activity: Pigouvian taxation. A Pigouvian tax is a fee imposed on
an actor engaging in some activity, equal in amount to the expected social costs of that activity. 11 A carbon tax is a Pigouvian
tax. It forces carbon emitters to account for the harm they cause
so that they engage in carbon-emitting activity only when the
benefits exceed the costs. 12
Pigouvian taxation of constitutionally protected activity
would work the same way. Gun ownership creates a risk of social
costs—from accidental or intentional shootings. A Pigouvian tax
on gun ownership, then, is one equal in amount to those expected
harms. The tax might take the form, for example, of an annual
fee in the range of, say, $1,000 per gun-owning household. 13 Alternatively, it might be imposed, in whole or in part, on gun manufacturers, on purchases, or on a consumable complement of
guns, like ammunition. Similarly, “fake news” stories generate
measurable costs in the form of damaged reputation (for those
lied about) and decision-making against interest (for those lied
to). A Pigouvian tax here might be imposed on social media giants, extracting some small fee for each interaction with fake
news—a “share,” a “like,” etc.—that their algorithms generate. In
both examples, many choices exist for precisely how the tax would
be designed, sized, and collected. But in each case, the key is to
pick a design that—to the best of our regulatory abilities—tracks
actual social costs, including variations between entities and over
time. 14
In important cases, Pigouvian taxes can thread a needle
that traditional laws have not, achieving both effectiveness and
10F

1F

12F

13F

14F

10 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283; see also Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller,
What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 310–13, 334–35 (2016).
11 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 93, 95 (2015).
12 Id. at 115–16.
13 This is a reasonable first-cut estimate of the average annual marginal social cost
per gun-owning household. See infra notes 291–97 and accompanying text. As described
below, the best Pigouvian taxes would vary the rates charged, commensurate with variation in social costs imposed by different taxed entities. See infra Part V.A.2.
14 See infra Part V.A.2.
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constitutionality. That is because, in at least three important doctrinal areas—guns, speech, and abortion—the Constitution requires proportionality between a law’s constitutional burdens and
its regulatory goals. 15 This is often called a tailoring requirement.
If a law imposes a substantial burden on some benefit the Constitution protects, but does little to reduce social harms, it fails the
tailoring test. To be sure, poor tailoring is not the only reason a
regulation may be struck down. In these doctrinal areas, the Constitution also imposes what one might call a legitimacy requirement. It categorically restricts which effects of protected activity
may legitimately be treated as social costs to be eliminated. 16 Historically, however, the constitutional difficulty has quite often
been tailoring, not legitimacy. 17
Tailoring is where Pigouvian taxes shine. Compared with traditional regulatory alternatives, the constitutional burdens imposed by Pigouvian taxes are easier to balance with reductions in
social costs. Indeed, a right-sized Pigouvian tax is identical to the
regulated activity’s social cost. 18 Moreover, unlike traditional
command-and-control rules, Pigouvian taxes never demand that
anyone cease engaging in a constitutionally protected activity.
Instead, people themselves weigh the costs and benefits and act
accordingly. Thus, a Pigouvian tax preserves people’s freedom to
access benefits that the Constitution protects. It deprives them
only of unprotected social subsidies for those activities in the form
of externalized costs.
Moreover, a well-designed Pigouvian tax imposes the minimum possible burden among cost-controlling regimes. 19 It permits
people to employ whatever constitutes, by their own lights, the
least burdensome means for reducing social harm while engaging
in protected activity. Indeed, it rewards them for doing so. If a
gun manufacturer, for example, invents and adopts a cheap, effective new safety feature, it thereby earns a reduction in its tax
burden. All of this suggests that if a right-sized Pigouvian tax is
not sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster, nothing is.
Traditional regulations do not work this way. Consider, for
example, a total ban on handguns. For some people—say, those
15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

15
16
17
18
19

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
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who will use a gun only at a range, rarely, and for fun—the private benefits of ownership may be dwarfed by social costs. But for
individuals with a significant need for concealable protection, the
total benefits of handgun ownership may outweigh the harms. A
ban prevents ownership in both cases. This avoids social costs
from shootings, but it also completely eliminates constitutionally
protected benefits for those who would choose to enjoy them, despite the costs. Putting the problem another way, the ban places
the highest possible constitutional burden on every instance of gun
ownership, regardless of the quantum of social costs avoided. Extreme disproportionality of this kind is a constitutional nonstarter.
Traditionally minded regulators can try to be more precise.
But command-and-control rules—bans, safety standards, licensing regimes, etc.—are inherently difficult to tailor. To achieve the
constitutionally mandated balance, lawmakers must evaluate
both the social costs and the constitutional benefits of the activity
to be forbidden. 20 Pigouvian regulators, by contrast, need measure
only the costs of the taxed activity. 21 Moreover, well-tailored
command-and-control rules must forbid only those categories of
activity reliably generating more social costs than constitutional
benefits. 22 Such categories may be difficult or impossible to identify. Accidental shootings, for example, are diffuse and hard to
individually predict. Thus, although every individual shooting is
devastating, average expected costs may be—on a risk-adjusted
basis—modest. It is thus unlikely that regulators could identify
any significant category of people whose gun ownership could be
restricted for the sake of preventing accidents. Pigouvian regulators, by contrast, can tax all gun owners in the amount of expected
harm. Then, people themselves perform the requisite balancing,
determining whether they reap enough constitutional benefit
from ownership to outweigh the expected costs.
Despite all of this, Pigouvian taxation of constitutionally
protected activity is not a panacea. Pigouvian taxes can resolve
certain, but not all, tensions between regulation and constitutionality. This Article defines three model taxes—on guns, fake news,
and abortions—to illustrate the solution’s promise and its limitations. Pigouvian taxation is an ideal tool when—as with guns and
fake news—the primary constitutional impediment to regulation
20F

21F

2F

20
21
22

See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 232–41 and accompanying text.
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is tailoring. 23 But in other cases—as with abortion—the core tension truly does arise from fundamental disagreement about what
counts as a legitimately regulable social cost. 24 In such cases,
shifting from traditional regulatory tools to Pigouvian taxes is unlikely to enable more regulation of protected activity.
Constitutional regulation via Pigouvian tax raises other puzzles, both practical and normative. The foremost practical question is how regulators could measure the social costs of protected
activities and thus set accurate tax rates. This Article contends
that, in many cases, frameworks already exist—in both law and
social science—for estimating such costs. 25 When targeted social
costs are familiar—as with the model taxes on guns and fake
news—those frameworks, though imperfect, are robust and already constitutionally approved. For more exotic costs, experience
from administrative agencies’ cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) suggests that adequate measurement is feasible. Of course, no
method for estimating social costs—whether from gun ownership
or carbon dioxide—is flawless. Any framework will produce some
error and disagreement. Nevertheless, as this Article argues,
modern, good-faith cost analyses are good enough to produce regulation that constitutes good public policy and—crucially—is constitutionally sound. 26
As for potential normative problems, regulation by Pigouvian
tax is sure to have distributional effects. Pigouvian taxes would
raise the price of constitutionally protected activity, making it
less available to the poor but easily accessible to the rich. This is
a serious concern. But it is one illuminated, rather than caused,
by thinking about constitutional regulation in explicit cost-benefit
terms. 27 All regulations affecting protected activity—health regulations for abortion providers, gun-permitting schemes, liability
for fraud—increase the cost of activity, either implicitly or explicitly. Yet current constitutional doctrine considers this problem
only obliquely and inconsistently. This Article suggests how existing constitutional rules could be updated to increase fairness,
particularly in this age of skyrocketing wealth inequality. 28 One
23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

28F

23
24
25
26
27
28

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.1.
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possibility would be to expand the application of existing doctrines that guarantee everyone, regardless of wealth, some minimum quantum of constitutional benefits. 29 Another solution
would be to redouble our commitment to redistributing wealth,
eliminating poverty, and ensuring that no one is denied any basic
goods, constitutional or otherwise.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly recounts how
the Constitution has clashed with regulation in three areas: guns,
speech, and abortion. These three examples ground the rest of the
Article’s analysis. Part II turns to Pigouvian taxation. It first describes Pigouvian taxes generally, including their basic features,
their practical superiority to command-and-control regulation, and
their historical successes. It then defines three model Pigouvian
taxes—on gun ownership, fake news, and abortion. Part III takes
up constitutional law. It argues that, in at least these three doctrinal areas, a single, transsubstantive framework drives the constitutional analysis. The Constitution blesses regulations targeting
legitimate social costs arising from protected activities. But such
regulations must balance reductions in social cost with burdens
on constitutionally protected benefits. Part IV then shows why
Pigouvian taxes are generally more likely than their traditional
analogues to achieve such a balance. It also deals in specifics. The
Part argues that the model taxes on guns and fake news would
avoid the particular constitutional pitfalls of their predecessors.
And it describes the methods by which social costs could be measured in order to set constitutionally sound tax rates. Finally, this
Part illustrates Pigouvian taxes’ limitations. Here, the model tax
on abortion serves as an example of where taxation would be unlikely to achieve additional regulation. Part V takes up practical
and normative challenges, arguing that, while important, they
can largely be overcome.
29F

I. THE REGULATORY DILEMMA: EFFECTIVENESS OR
CONSTITUTIONALITY?
This Part briefly recounts the tension between constitutional
protections and lawmakers’ regulatory goals in the realms of
guns, speech, and abortion. In each area, it has seemed, the regulations likely to have the biggest effects are those least likely to
pass constitutional muster.

29

See infra Part V.B.1.
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Why should these three case studies anchor the Article? First,
the set includes two cases—guns and speech—where Pigouvian
taxes can facilitate additional regulation of protected activity and
one case—abortion—where they likely cannot. 30 Second, these examples are salient, representing instances where some lawmakers
very much wish to regulate, but the Constitution seems to stand
in their way. 31
What can these case studies tell us about other constitutionally protected activities? Should regulators also tax them? That
depends on whether they raise the regulatory dilemma at issue
here. Speaking online, owning a gun, and obtaining an abortion
are all individual activities. They are things people can simply go
out and do on their own. And regulators worry that when people
do these things, they generate harm. This harm invites regulation, despite the activities’ constitutional protections, raising the
tension that Pigouvian taxes might help resolve.
But most of the Constitution’s provisions do not generate tension of this kind. They do not protect activities that people can
individually engage in and thereby generate costs. Some provisions instead forbid the government from engaging in certain activity—for example, the Equal Protection Clause’s bar on discrimination. 32 There is no constitutional dilemma inherent in
regulating discrimination by the government. Legislators can ban
it entirely without raising any constitutional concerns. The same
goes for, say, unreasonable searches. 33 The Constitution’s structural requirements—for example, the separation of powers 34—are
30F

31F

32F

3F

34F

30

See infra Parts IV.B, IV.D.
Certainly, factors other than constitutionality, like politics, also matter.
32 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Constitution presents no obstacle to banning government discrimination or unreasonable searches. But the Constitution’s prohibition on those
government activities sometimes makes other regulatory goals more difficult to achieve.
Antidiscrimination rules might impede, for example, public universities’ diversity goals.
And the warrant requirement makes policing more laborious. Here, Pigouvian taxes might
play a role—though inverted from the general scheme of this Article. If the government
discriminates or conducts unreasonable searches as it pursues its other legitimate goals,
perhaps it should pay citizens for the harm it causes, instead of the other way around.
This is not so different from the schemes imposed, at least in theory, by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971). See infra Part V.A.3 (comparing Pigouvian taxation and tort liability). But, as
currently implemented, those schemes are quite underinclusive, granting compensation
for only a small fraction of violations. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857
(2017) (cabining Bivens); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model
of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519–24 (2016) (discussing qualified immunity).
34 U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
31
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even further afield from the problem Pigouvian taxes can help
solve.
But the Constitution does protect other individual activities
(like religious exercise 35 or free movement 36) that (like guns,
speech, or abortion) might generate social costs. It also protects
some activities that citizens and governments perform in tandem—like voting 37 or using the courts. 38 These could pose similar
regulatory challenges. Pigouvian taxes might be useful in any of
these areas. But their viability depends on whether substantive
constitutional structures protecting these activities mirror the
rules protecting gun ownership, speech, and abortion. 39 Likely,
some will not (or will not entirely). 40 This Article’s analysis—legal, practical, and normative—thus provides a foundation for further research about Pigouvian taxation of additional protected activities.
Begin with guns. In the second half of the twentieth century,
lawmakers in cities like Chicago and Washington, D.C., were concerned about the social costs of gun ownership. They had—and
still have—good reason. Gun injuries and deaths from homicide,
suicide, and accidents are a serious problem in the United States.
Overall homicide rates are roughly seven times that of other economically developed countries, driven by gun homicide rates
twenty-five times higher. 41 When you add accidents and suicides,
which outnumber homicides, 42 gun death rates are ten times
35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

40F

41F

42F

35

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869) (describing the constitutional right of
“free ingress into other States, and egress from them”).
37 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (ruling that the Virginia
poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause). Someone must pay to print the ballots.
38 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that a state may not
deny someone access to the courts to dissolve their marriage based solely on inability to
pay). Someone must pay for judges, clerks, court reporters, bailiffs, and others.
39 See infra Part III.
40 Consider, for example, that under Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990), the Free Exercise Clause—
unlike the Free Speech Clause—requires no tailoring of a “valid and neutral law of general
applicability.” Id. at 879 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). But see Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189–90 (2012) (holding that
Smith does not apply to all neutral and generally applicable laws).
41 See Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, Violent Death Rates: The U.S. Compared with Other High-Income OECD Countries, 2010, 129 AM. J. MED. 266, 268 (2016).
42 See Jason E. Goldstick, April Zeoli, Christina Mair & Rebecca M. Cunningham,
US Firearm-Related Mortality: National, State, and Population Trends, 1999–2017, 38
HEALTH AFFS. 1646, 1647 exhibit 2 (2019).
36
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higher than other rich countries. 43 Moreover, for the first time in
decades, U.S. gun deaths are on the rise. 44 Empirical research
suggests that gun ownership rates have a causal, not merely correlative, relationship to these tragic figures. 45 Thus, by the late
1980s, both Chicago and D.C. enacted what amounted to total
bans on handguns 46—the type of gun involved in the vast majority
of killings. 47
However, such broad and aggressive regulations of guns are
unconstitutional. In Heller, the Supreme Court overturned D.C.’s
ban. It did so precisely because the law was so far-reaching. 48 The
Court reasoned that, unlike other traditional—and more limited—regulations, D.C.’s law imposed constitutional burdens that
could not be justified by its reductions in social costs. 49
In the aftermath of Heller, many mainstream, high-profile
politicians have dialed back their regulatory ambitions. They
have retreated to proposals that, by design, regulate only a small
sliver of guns or owners, thereby passing constitutional muster. 50
Among the most popular of these are proposals to outlaw particular subclasses of guns or accessories—assault weapons, largecapacity magazines, or add-ons like bump stocks. 51 But assault
weapons, for example, are used in only about 2%—or at most
43F

4F

45F

46F

47F

48F

49F

50F

51F

43

See Grinshteyn & Hemenway, supra note 41, at 270.
See Goldstick et al., supra note 42, at 1650–51.
45 See, e.g., Sripal Bangalore & Franz H. Messerli, Gun Ownership and FirearmRelated Deaths, 126 AM. J. MED. 873, 875 (2013) (all firearm-related deaths); Philip J.
Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 379, 387 (2006)
(homicide); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1088 (2001)
(homicide); J. John Mann & Christina A. Michel, Prevention of Firearm Suicide in the
United States: What Works and What Is Possible, 173 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 969, 970 (2016)
(suicide).
46 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75; McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 3645, 2008
WL 5111112, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2008).
47 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2016 Crime in the United States: Expanded
Homicide Table 4, https://perma.cc/5GHU-KJZE (homicide); see also Steven Stack & Ira
Wasserman, Gender and Suicide Risk: The Role of Wound Site, 39 SUICIDE & LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 13, 18 tbl.4 (2009) (suicide); R.E. Kohlmeier, C.A. McMahan &
V.J.M. DiMaio, Suicide by Firearms: A 15-Year Experience, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. &
PATHOLOGY 337, 340 (2001) (suicide).
48 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–30; see also infra Part III.A.
49 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–30.
50 See Haslett & Sergi, supra note 7.
51 Id.
44
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8%—of gun crimes. 52 Thus, even assuming perfect implementation and enforcement, along with zero substitution of other weapons, the effects of such a ban are sure to be minor. Research on
the now-defunct federal assault weapons ban concludes as
much. 53 Background checks 54 likewise operate as bans on relatively small slivers of people—like convicted felons—buying guns.
Like assault weapon bans, they leave most of the cost-producing
population unregulated. It is not surprising, then, that a recent
RAND metastudy found only limited evidence that background
checks produce any decrease in violent crime or homicide rates. 55
Lawmakers appear similarly stuck when it comes to regulating fake news. During the 2016 election between Hillary Clinton
and Donald Trump, just 156 election-related fake news stories
were shared nearly 40 million times on social media, resulting in
as many as 760 million click-throughs to read a fake story. 56
About 74% of all stories and 80% of shares were pro-Trump. 57
These stories claimed, for example, that Clinton ran a child sex
ring based in a pizza shop and that Democrats planned to impose
Islamic law in Florida. 58 One fake pro-Clinton story claimed that
thousands of people at a Trump rally chanted, “We hate Muslims,
we hate blacks, we want our great country back.” 59
52F

53F

54F

5F

56F

57F

58F

59F

52 See Christopher S. Koper, Daniel J. Woods & Jeffrey A. Roth, An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994–2003, at 2 (July 2004), https://perma.cc/3GHD-W5D3; Christopher S. Koper,
William D. Johnson, Jordan L. Nichols, Ambrozine Ayers & Natalie Mullins, Criminal Use
of Assault Weapons and High-Capacity Semiautomatic Firearms: An Updated Examination of Local and National Sources, 95 J. URB. HEALTH 313, 314 (2018).
53 See, e.g., Lois K. Lee, Eric W. Fleegler, Caitlin Farrell, Elorm Avakame, Saranya
Srinivasan, David Hemenway & Michael C. Monuteaux, Firearm Laws and Firearm Homicides, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 106, 117 (2017).
54 See Haslett & Sergi, supra note 7.
55 See Effects of Background Checks on Violent Crime, RAND CORP. (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Z8JL-Y2JT.
56 See Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 2, at 212.
57 Id.
58 Angie Drobnic Holan, 2016 Lie of the Year: Fake News, POLITIFACT (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/W2RS-RP23.
59 Id. Note that Trump rally attendees did chant the similarly racist slogan, “send
her back,” directed at four non-White Congresswomen. See Joseph Zeballos-Roig & Walt
Hickey, Over One-Third of Republican Primary Voters Supported the Racist Chants at
Trump’s North Carolina Rally, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/4FZG-FNM9.
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Moreover, some of 2016’s fake stories were distributed by
Russian intelligence agencies to disrupt the U.S. electoral process. 60 The effects may have gone well beyond disruption. At least
one study suggests that fake news alone might have convinced
enough Obama voters to defect to Trump to swing the election. 61
To reiterate, an online fake news campaign, run in part by a hostile foreign government, may have changed the outcome of the
2016 U.S. presidential election. 62
Fake news can be harmful even when not political. Cuttingedge technologies, like “deep fakes” (wholly concocted videos that
look real), are enabling new and disturbing methods of online
abuse among private individuals. Deep fakes allow anyone to, for
example, convincingly insert anyone else’s face into a pornographic
video. 63 Victims of these fakes range from celebrities to former romantic partners and are almost always women. 64
As with guns, even aggressive critics of fake news have despaired of lawmakers’ ability to enact laws meaningfully curbing
its spread. Professor Cass Sunstein has recently argued that First
Amendment decisions like United States v. Alvarez 65 and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 66 bar laws that could effectively regulate online falsehoods. 67 This leads him to advocate constitutional
reform, updating precedents that are “dinosaur[s] in light of what
is happening online.” 68 Other scholars have agreed that constitutional change is needed. 69 In the absence of such change, still others have proposed minor tweaks to the system—media literacy
60F

61F

62F

63F

64F

65F

6F

67F

68F

69F

60 See Richard Lardner & Deb Riechmann, Intel Officials Detail How Russian
Cyberattacks Sought to Interfere with U.S. Elections, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/H45L-2JXS.
61 See Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck & Erik C. Nisbet, “Fake News” and the Defection of 2012 Obama Voters in the 2016 Presidential Election, 61 ELECTORAL STUD., OCT.
2019, at 6.
62 Id.
63 See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1772–73 (2019).
64 Id.
65 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
66 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67 See Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
388, 389 (2020).
68 Id. at 389.
69 See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 55, 97
(2018); Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the Fight Against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2645–49 (2019) (critiquing existing First Amendment doctrine because it prevents lawmakers from directly
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education, additional fact checkers, or codes of ethics for political
campaigns—that are unlikely to make much of a difference. 70
Here, as with guns, the choice seems to be between ineffective
regulation and longshot constitutional reform.
Finally, consider abortion. Nearly fifty years ago, Roe v.
Wade 71 held that criminal bans on abortions before fetal viability
were unconstitutional. Pro-life lawmakers see the decision as
fundamentally incompatible with their regulatory goals. They
therefore advocate a rollback of a woman’s constitutional right
to terminate her pregnancy. For decades, a concerted conservative movement in the United States has focused on appointing
Supreme Court Justices who will overturn Roe. 72 And with Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s replacement by Justice Brett Kavanaugh—
and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s replacement by Justice Amy
Coney Barrett—some believe the project has succeeded. 73 Time
will tell. In the meantime, antiabortion lawmakers have enacted
numerous abortion restrictions that fall short of criminal bans.
Many of these less restrictive laws are putatively aimed only at
ensuring abortion procedures are safe, 74 though there is ample
reason to suspect pretext. 75 Either way, the most aggressive of
them have been struck down as unconstitutional. 76
Thus, lawmakers appear trapped between the Constitution’s
vital guarantees of individual liberty and the putative harms
that follow when that liberty is exercised. The following parts
argue that a regulatory design from the economist’s toolkit—the
Pigouvian tax—is uniquely suited to resolve this tension, at least
in some important cases.
70F

71F

72F

73F

74F

75F

76F

addressing the problem of fake news). But see Chesney & Citron, supra note 65, at 1791
(arguing that First Amendment precedent “leav[es] considerable room for carefully tailored prohibitions of certain harmful deep fakes”).
70 See Manzi, supra note 69, at 49 (collecting such proposals and discussing their
likely ineffectiveness).
71 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72 Jon Swaine, The Anti-Abortion Conservative Quietly Guiding Trump’s Supreme
Court Pick, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q9FU-3DH6.
73 Scott Lemieux, Yes, Roe Really Is in Trouble, VOX (May 15, 2019),
https://perma.cc/X572-7ASQ; Devin Dwyer, Liberals Alarmed for Roe v. Wade As Supreme
Court Conservatives Overturn 40-Year-Old Precedent, ABC NEWS (May 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/Z948-23GN.
74 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311 (2016).
75 Denise Lavoie & Carl Willis, Abortion-Rights Groups Challenge TRAP Laws That
Restrict Providers, Limit Women’s Choices, ABC7 WJLA (May 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/D2HM-DPYV.
76 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
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II. PIGOUVIAN TAXES: AN OVERVIEW
Pigouvian taxes have long been favored by economists for
pure policy reasons, aside from their constitutional advantages
explored in this Article. This Part briefly explains why. It then
goes on to define the three model Pigouvian taxes—targeting specific social costs from gun ownership, fake news, and abortions—
that frame the rest of the Article’s analysis.
A.

The Structure and Policy Advantages of Pigouvian Taxes

To understand Pigouvian 77 taxation as a regulatory tool, consider that human activities often produce both benefits and costs.
Imagine, for example, a factory producing both useful products
and harmful pollution. The rational, self-interested factory owner
will produce a marginal unit of her product only if the costs she
bears (like materials and labor) are less than the benefit she will
receive (the price consumers are willing to pay). Crucially, absent
regulation, the owner does not bear most of the cost of pollution.
Instead, third parties who live near the factory and suffer ill
health effects bear it. Thus, the factory owner’s costs remain artificially low, and she produces some units for which total social
costs exceed total benefits.
A Pigouvian tax is one that forces the factory owner to account for costs that she would otherwise ignore. 78 The tax for each
marginal unit of product equals the harms from the pollution
emitted in the production of that unit. A properly sized Pigouvian
tax raises the product’s price to reflect true social costs, and the
factory owner runs the factory only when doing so, on net, benefits
the world. 79
Economists have long argued that Pigouvian taxes are better
policy tools than traditional alternatives. 80 For one thing, they
present fewer opportunities for mistakes. Consider the most common traditional regulatory scheme: command-and-control. Quotas are command-and-control schemes, placing a ceiling on the
maximum number of units a factory may produce. But to set the
right quota, regulators must estimate both the total costs and
7F

78F

79F

80F

77 The name “Pigouvian” (also rendered “Pigovian”) refers to Arthur Pigou, the British
economist who first advocated corrective taxes to reduce industrial pollution. See generally
ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
78 Donatella Baiardi & Mario Menegatti, Pigouvian Tax, Abatement Policies and Uncertainty on the Environment, 103 J. ECON. 221, 222 (2011).
79 Masur & Posner, supra note 11, at 95.
80 Id. at 96.
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benefits of production, determining at what point the former exceed the latter. 81 This problem becomes especially acute when
benefits vary from factory to factory—for example, if some produce better products than others. Then, an efficient quota requires separate, factory-by-factory benefit estimates. By contrast,
Pigouvian regulators need to know only the harm from the marginal unit of pollution, not its private benefits. 82 They can then set
the tax equal to the harm, and factory owners, who know their
own private benefits, will individually balance benefits and costs.
Another advantage of Pigouvian taxes is that they are technology forcing. A factory owner whose cap on production is fixed
has no incentive to reduce per-unit emissions. Nor does a factory
owner whose regulatory scheme requires, for example, a specific
minimum suite of emission-reducing technologies, but no more. 83
By contrast, a Pigouvian tax keyed to the factory’s actual emissions creates an incentive for the company to figure out ways to
reduce its per-unit pollution. The promise of lower taxes for less
emissions acts as a payment to the factory for investing in green
technology.
Real-world experience bears out economists’ enthusiasm for
Pigouvian taxes. Where they have been tried, Pigouvian taxes
and their close cousins 84 seem to produce significant behavioral
changes. 85 The highest-profile example from the United States may
be the Ozone Depleting Chemicals Tax. That policy was implemented by Congress in the late 1980s to comply with the Montreal
Protocol and avert the destruction of Earth’s ozone layer. 86 Once
81F

82F

83F

84F

85F

86F

81

Id. at 101.
Id.
83 Id. at 101–02.
84 Since legislators often fail to show their work, it can be difficult to tell how closely
certain taxes track the true Pigouvian rate. Masur & Posner, supra note 11, at 104–08.
85 One should expect such results insofar as people make rational choices based on
changes in price. People do not always do this, but they appear able to account for such
changes, especially when taxes are made salient at the point of transaction. See Raj
Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 1145, 1170–71 (2009).
86 Bruce Pasfield & Elise Paeffgen, How to Enforce a Carbon Tax: Lessons from the
Montreal Protocol and the U.S. Experience with the Ozone Depleting Chemicals Tax, 14
VT. J. ENV’T L. 389, 393, 395–96 (2013).
82
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early enforcement issues were resolved, 87 the tax was a substantial success. Under it, the United States has exceeded its targets
for reducing emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. 88
Other taxes aimed at socially costly activities have likewise
generated strong effects. A handful of U.S. cities now have taxes
on sugary drinks, 89 ranging from $0.34–$0.68 per liter. A recent
empirical study of such taxes suggested that the low-end tax of
$0.34 per liter leads to a 22% reduction in consumption. 90 If such a
tax were implemented nationwide, its estimated effects on obesity
and related diseases would produce a net reduction of $1.4 billion
in social costs each year. 91 Similarly, some local governments
have imposed taxes on disposable grocery bags. 92 In its first year,
Chicago’s $0.07 fee per bag led to a 27.7 percentage-point reduction, from a baseline of 82%, in customers using disposable bags. 93
Other localities have seen even bigger effects, like Montgomery
County, Maryland, where a $0.05 fee produced a 42 percentagepoint reduction. 94 While economists have not yet comprehensively
evaluated the net welfare effects of such taxes, preliminary results suggest they are positive. 95
87F

8F

89F

90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

95F

87

Id. at 397–98.
See J. Andrew Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS 39, 39 (Elizabeth Cook ed., 1996) (describing how the tax
and related policies enabled the United States to exceed its targets); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., OZONE DEPLETING CHEMICALS (ODC) EXCISE TAX AUDIT TECHNIQUES GUIDE 5
(2007) (describing the success of the tax and related policies at raising prices and reducing
consumption).
89 Some of the social costs associated with consuming sugar are rightly considered
internalities, not externalities. For a discussion of how internalities fit into this Article’s
analysis, see infra note 321.
90 Anna H. Grummon, Benjamin B. Lockwood, Dmitry Taubinsky & Hunt Allcott,
Designing Better Sugary Drink Taxes, 365 SCIENCE 989, 989 (2019).
91 Id.
92 TATIANA HOMONOFF, LEE-SIEN KAO, DOUG PALMER & CHRISTINA SEYBOLT,
SKIPPING THE BAG: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CHICAGO’S TAX ON DISPOSABLE BAGS 3–4
(2018), https://perma.cc/A5ZC-CHQF.
93 Id. at 4.
94 Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes
Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 177, 190 (2018).
95 See Frank Convery, Simon McDonnell & Susana Ferreira, The Most Popular Tax
in Europe? Lessons from the Irish Plastic Bags Levy, 38 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 1, 7–10 (2007);
Rebecca L. Taylor & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Bans vs. Fees: Disposable Carryout Bag Policies
and Bag Usage, 38 APPLIED ECON. PERSPS. & POL’Y 351, 371 (2016).
88
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Three Hypothetical Pigouvian Taxes

This Article anchors its analysis to three model taxes on constitutionally protected activities generating hard-to-regulate social costs: owning guns, disseminating fake news, and obtaining
abortions. These examples are selected to show the contours of
Pigouvian taxation as a tool for regulating constitutionally protected activity. Two promising examples—guns and fake news—
will show when and how Pigouvian taxes can resolve the tension
between effective regulation and constitutionality. The other—
abortion—will illustrate the kind of constitutional tension
Pigouvian taxes cannot overcome.
The three example taxes are defined as follows: The Pigouvian
tax on gun ownership would target bodily and financial harms
from intentional and accidental shootings. 96 The Pigouvian tax on
fake news would target reputational harms like lost revenue or
professional opportunity. It would also target fraud-related
harms like the lost opportunity to make a truthfully informed
choice, including a vote. The Pigouvian tax on abortions would
target the loss of potential life and the medical risks to the
woman. Note these policies’ specificity. They are not designed to
reduce protected activity per se, but rather specific harms stemming from those activities.
These definitions enshrine each tax’s core regulatory objective. Implementing them would, of course, necessitate many detailed decisions about policy design. Who should pay the tax?
When? How should rates be set and varied? Part V discusses the
constitutional and normative principles that should guide such
decisions.
96F

III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FAVORING PIGOUVIAN

96 While a few scholars have considered Pigouvian taxes on guns from the perspective of public policy, none has made this Article’s main argument: Pigouvian taxes have a
significant constitutional advantage over other regulatory designs. Professor Victor
Fleischer, in a generalized argument against Pigouvian taxation, has written that setting
the correct tax on guns presents difficult information problems. Victor Fleischer, Curb
Your Enthusiasm for Pigouvian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1677–81 (2019); see also
infra Part IV.C. Professor Samuel D. Brunson argues for something he calls a Pigouvian
tax on guns. See Samuel D. Brunson, Paying for Gun Violence, 104 MINN. L. REV. 605, 607
(2019). But one could question whether that approach is Pigouvian at all, insofar as
Brunson’s “proposal is not intended to change individuals’ behavior.” Id. at 623. Professors
Brian Galle and Murat Mungan have briefly advocated a true Pigouvian tax on firearm
ownership for reasons of sound public policy. Brian Galle & Murat Mungan, Predictable
Punishments, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 337, 380 (2020).
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TAXATION
If traditional regulations have been unable to redress important social harms while remaining constitutional, when and
why should Pigouvian taxes fare better? This Part lays the legal
groundwork for answering these questions. The Part aims to
demonstrate three things true in at least the law of guns, speech,
and abortion. 97 First, policy design matters immensely to constitutionality. And the Constitution’s strictures for policy design reflect, to a surprising degree, the kind of cost-benefit thinking familiar to economists. In short, these constitutional rights
protecting individual activity are not absolute. Protected activities can create social costs, and the Constitution does not require
society to implicitly subsidize such activities by absorbing any
and all of those costs. Rather, it blesses properly designed laws
aimed at reducing them.
Second, this Part argues that, across these constitutional doctrines, regulations of protected activity live or die by two factors:
legitimacy and tailoring. First, legitimacy: For a law to survive
scrutiny, it must be aimed at controlling effects of protected activities that can be legitimately treated as social costs. Under the
First Amendment, for example, reputational harm to individuals
from defamation is a legitimately regulable social cost. 98 But damage to the government’s reputation from criticism is not. Rather,
the freedom to criticize the sovereign must be treated as a core
benefit the First Amendment protects. 99 Moreover, if a regulation
is particularly burdensome on or odious to protected benefits, it
can only be justified if it targets particularly important social
costs. Second, tailoring: Even laws passing these legitimacy
thresholds must be properly tailored. Principally, this means that
they must reduce social costs without too disproportionately undermining the benefits that the Constitution protects.
This legitimacy-tailoring framework should sound familiar.
After all, the term “tailoring” appears explicitly in one of the bestknown constitutional tests—strict scrutiny. In fact, the strict
scrutiny test contains both elements. Under it, a law is constitutional only if it furthers a “compelling Government interest” 100—
a particularly important variety of legitimately regulable cost. And
97F

98F

9F

10F

97 This Part makes the arguments as to guns and speech. Part IV.D shows how they
apply to the law of abortion.
98 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974).
99 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 291–92.
100 See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
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the law must further be “narrowly tailored” to that interest 101—
carefully avoiding constitutional burdens in excess of the targeted
social cost. Many other constitutional tests exist. The discussion
below shows how the legitimacy and tailoring requirements are
embedded everywhere. 102
Not everyone will agree that the legitimacy-tailoring framework pervades constitutional analysis—even in the three doctrinal areas explored here. Proportionality, in particular, is the subject of ongoing debate. 103 Recently, conservative members of the
Roberts Court—including the late Justice Antonin Scalia—have
attempted to shift constitutional law away from balancing and toward more categorical rules. 104 And on the other side of the political aisle, Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued that rights
should act as “trumps,” not as interests to be balanced against
other societal goals. 105
The doctrinal arguments below are thus both descriptive and
normative. This Article contends that the existing law of guns,
speech, and abortion is best understood as revolving around legitimacy and tailoring. It acknowledges that certain members of the
Court may be skeptical of at least the latter half of that claim.
But the Article argues that even rules that facially eschew proportionality almost inevitably end up reincorporating its logic. 106
Moreover, this result should be normatively acceptable across
interpretive philosophies. As shown below, even originalism—a
10F

102F

103F

104F

105F

106F

101

Id.
Professor Richard Fallon’s deep dive into the nature of strict scrutiny and related
tests catalogues the Court’s often-puzzling deviations from this model. Sometimes, for example, the Justices do speak of rights as if they were absolute. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 40–43 (2019). But such rhetoric, “in most cases[,]
. . . almost inevitably lead[s] back to functionalism.” Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J.
308, 367 (2019).
103 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124
YALE L.J. 3094, 3153–66 (2015).
104 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1182, 1185–87 (1989); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2135–39
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (calling for more categorical analysis in
abortion-rights doctrine); see also Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and
the Rise of the Anti-Classificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 234–35 (2017)
(analyzing an attempt to impose a categorical test for content neutrality in First Amendment
cases).
105 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1977).
106 See infra Part III.B.3; infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text; infra note 342;
see also FALLON, supra note 102, at 109–11, 113–16.
102
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preferred conservative theory—can incorporate legitimacy and
tailoring as the yardstick for constitutionality. 107
This Article therefore joins a growing chorus of constitutional
scholars arguing that, despite some protestations to the contrary,
proportionality analysis is—and should be—crucial to constitutional law. Professor Jamal Greene has recently written that
“[t]he U.S. Supreme Court balances pervasively, and what categor[ical] [rules] it maintains are riddled with exceptions.” 108
Professor Vicki Jackson has likewise identified proportionality as
a core principle in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as wherever strict scrutiny is applied. 109 Both professors
favor increasingly explicit proportionality analysis, both for its
policy consequences and because it comports with a Founding-era
understanding of the Constitution. 110 Professor Michael Coenen
has catalogued how First Amendment doctrine looks favorably on
regulations that impose light penalties while rejecting similar
laws that impose heavy ones. 111 Professor Joseph Blocher has argued that Second Amendment analysis must inevitably include
balancing, since a categorical approach “neither reflects nor enables a coherent account of the [ ] Amendment’s core values.” 112
Professor Josh Blackman has likewise argued that Second
107F

108F

109F

10F

1F

12F

107 See infra note 138 and accompanying text. It is easy to see how a philosophy like
Professor David Strauss’s, with its emphasis on policy tradeoffs and common law change,
could accept legitimacy and tailoring as emergent tests for constitutionality. See David A.
Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 977–84 (2011).
108 Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (2018). Greene rightly
observes that present-day constitutional practice also includes categorical considerations,
the resolution of which can stunt or foreclose proportionality analysis. Id. at 38–56. Such
categorical considerations fall under the legitimacy prong of the framework developed
here.
109 Jackson, supra note 103, at 3104–05.
110 Greene, supra note 108, at 109–10; Jackson, supra note 103, at 3106. Some
originalist scholars would no doubt disagree. This Article, however, is concerned with understanding our present-day constitutional doctrine, originalist or otherwise. Moreover,
some prominent originalists have recently argued that contemporary constitutional law
is, in fact, rightly considered originalist. See generally William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding
Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2019). If one accepts large swaths of extant individualrights case law as correctly decided, it is difficult to see how one could simultaneously
reject all models resembling the one advocated in this Article. See FALLON, supra note 102,
at 8.
111 Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach
to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1002–16 (2012).
112 Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 413 (2009).
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Amendment jurisprudence should be firmly rooted in proportionality, in part because other individual-rights doctrines
are. 113 And Professors Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet have
explored the historical roots of proportionality analysis in U.S.
constitutional law. 114
This Article builds on that scholarship. But it advances a
framework that includes both a proportionality requirement and
a categorical, rule-like legitimacy requirement. And, for the first
time, it frames both requirements explicitly using the economic
concepts of social cost and benefit.
The resulting model most closely resembles Professor Richard
Fallon’s. In both a law review article and a recent book, Fallon
carefully reconstructs the core features of strict judicial scrutiny
and argues that less-exacting constitutional tests often share
those features. 115 According to Fallon, any determination of
whether someone has an “ultimate” constitutional right to be free
from a constitutionally salient law proceeds in phases. 116 First,
courts must identify what interests both the constitutional right
in question and the regulation under review serve. 117 The stringency of judicial review depends on how odiously the regulation
burdens constitutionally protected interests. 118 When the constitutional burden is particularly heavy, only the most qualitatively
important regulatory interests can justify the regulation. 119 Those
steps map roughly onto this Article’s legitimacy framework, as
further explicated below. 120 Then, in Fallon’s view, courts must
ask whether the regulation is sufficiently tailored—an inquiry
fundamentally requiring a proportionality between regulatory
and constitutional interests. 121 That analysis corresponds to this
13F

14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

120F

12F

113 Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
951, 1004–31 (2011) (arguing that, across individual rights, the Constitution balances social costs against protected benefits).
114 See, e.g., Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American
Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 813–33 (2010).
115 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1315–
34 (2007); FALLON, supra note 102, at 47–66.
116 FALLON, supra note 102, at 48.
117 See id. at 47–59.
118 Id. at 48–54.
119 Id. at 54–59.
120 See infra Part III.C.
121 FALLON, supra note 102, at 60–66.
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Article’s formulation of the tailoring test, with proportionality at
its center. 122
The examples below also demonstrate this Part’s third key
point: where traditional regulations have stumbled, the problem
has often been tailoring. Even when lawmakers target social costs
that the Constitution treats as legitimately regulable, they repeatedly struggle to balance those costs with constitutional burdens.
12F

A.

The Constitutional Law of Guns

In Heller, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the
Second Amendment enshrines an individual right to own guns. 123
The Court invalidated D.C.’s law banning possession of handguns
and its mandatory trigger lock provision. 124 Second Amendment
law remains nascent, with only one major Supreme Court case
since Heller. 125 Even so, constitutional law protecting gun ownership already contains the key two-part analysis relevant here.
First, the Second Amendment affirmatively permits lawmakers
to target certain legitimate social costs by regulating gun ownership. Second, it imposes a tailoring requirement, disapproving
laws that work a disproportionate reduction in constitutionally
protected benefits as compared with their reductions in regulable
costs. The difficulty, at least in cases that have reached the Supreme
Court, has been tailoring.
On a first reading, Heller appears to reject proportionality as
a relevant standard. The majority excoriated Justice Stephen
Breyer, in dissent, for advocating a “freestanding” and thus
“judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry.’” 126 But the Court
cannot have meant that proportionality inquiries have no place
in Second Amendment jurisprudence. For one thing, the Court
wrote that it “kn[e]w of no other enumerated constitutional right
whose core protection has been subjected to” a test like Justice
Breyer’s. 127 Yet the Court was aware of tests, like strict and intermediate scrutiny, that explicitly ask about the balance between
123F

124F

125F

126F

127F

122 Note that Fallon’s book spends many pages mining the subtleties, variations, and
contradictions in how these tests are applied. This Article lacks the space to be so expansive. Such subtleties and apparent contradictions exist. But I follow Fallon in contending
that the only way to understand any significant portion of the case law is by invoking a
framework like the one advocated here. Id. at 43–46.
123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 622.
124 Id. at 635.
125 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
126 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (quoting id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
127 Id.
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constitutional burdens and a statute’s prosocial effects. The majority’s objection must then have been that proportionality cannot
stand on its own, as it might in some other constitutional democracies. 128 Instead, additional rule-like constraints—like the legitimacy requirement—must apply.
Indeed, the Heller majority’s reasoning did turn on the legitimacy of regulated costs and the law’s tailoring. The Court began
by agreeing that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited. . . . [T]he right [is] not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 129 On the question of
which costs are legitimately regulable, the Court agreed that the
social costs from “handgun violence in this country” could be regulated using “a variety of tools . . . including some measures regulating handguns.” 130 The Court also approved of Founding-era
laws aimed at controlling the “great Damages . . . frequently done
. . . by persons . . . with Guns and other Fire Arms.” 131
As for tailoring, the Court favored Founding-era laws that
“d[id] not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an
absolute ban on handguns.” 132 Those laws, the Court thought,
were more balanced, regulating moderate costs by imposing moderate burdens—for example, “punish[ing] the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in
a few cases a very brief stay in the local jail), not with significant
criminal penalties.” 133 But the Court also looked favorably on
modern laws that impose heavy burdens—criminal bans—only on
particularly costly instances of gun possession. It wrote that
“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding” laws restricting “the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “forbidding the carrying of firearms in
128F

129F

130F

13F

132F

13F

128

Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 114, at 802; Greene, supra note 108, at 85–96.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
130 Id. at 636.
131 Id. at 632 (quoting Chapter 1501, in 5 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM
THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 244, 244–46 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1894)).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 633.
129
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sensitive places,” or outlawing “dangerous and unusual weapons.” 134 The Court considered these “only as examples” of permissible, well-balanced restrictions. 135 It did not “purport to be exhaustive.” 136 Other longstanding, properly tailored regulations—
like tort liability for negligent shootings—are also almost certainly allowed. 137
Certain readers may balk at this characterization of Heller,
worrying that it willfully ignores the majority’s declared originalism. 138 But Heller is best understood as endorsing the legitimacytailoring paradigm because it comports with the Second Amendment’s original public meaning. The analysis above acknowledges
Heller’s heavy emphasis on Founding-era and longstanding firearms restrictions. The key question for originalists is what those
laws tell us about the Second Amendment’s original meaning.
What about them comported, in the Founding generation’s eyes,
with the Constitution? And what principles can we therefore
carry forward and apply when analyzing new kinds of firearms
regulations? Heller’s answer, as demonstrated above, is that
Founding-era laws squared with the Second Amendment for two
reasons. They regulated legitimate costs, and they were welltailored, imposing only modest burdens on modestly costly activity and heavier burdens on costlier activity. There is nothing unoriginalist about this line of reasoning.
The problem with D.C.’s law was tailoring. The Court recognized the legitimacy of D.C.’s targeted social cost—gun violence. 139 But it held that the law was too burdensome on the constitutionally protected benefit of self-defense. 140 Though D.C.’s
law targeted harmful gun use, it did so by “prohibiti[ng] . . . an
entire class of arms,” including every instance where handguns
are purchased “for th[e] lawful purpose” of self-defense. 141 Moreover, the law imposed its burden on self-defense in “the home,
where the need . . . is most acute.” 142 The Court therefore held that
the law would fail “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that
134F

135F

136F

137F

138F

139F

140F

14F

142F

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
Id. at 627 n.26.
Id.
Blocher & Miller, supra note 10, at 310–13, 334–35.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
Id. at 636.
See id. at 627–28.
Id. at 628 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.” 143 Such
overbreadth could not be tolerated under any version of the tailoring test.
Since Heller, the lower courts have largely converged on legitimacy and tailoring in the Second Amendment. They generally
apply strict or intermediate scrutiny—which contain both elements 144—to gun-related constitutional claims. 145
143F

14F

B.

145F

The Constitutional Law of Speech

Free speech case law is rich and varied, yet legitimacy and
tailoring pervade it. The examples here show how different regulatory designs—including fees on speech—live or die by these
twin requirements. They also show how the strictness of the requirements varies with the kind of law under review. The examples even demonstrate that legitimacy and tailoring underpin
rules that do not invoke them explicitly. As with guns, tailoring
is also where laws regulating speech often stumble.
1. Fees imposed on speech.
This Article’s proposal for imposing fees on speakers to make
them bear their own social costs is not unprecedented. In Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 146 a county levied fees on public
demonstrations so that “those participating [would] be held accountable” for the increased “cost of law enforcement” during
their march. 147 The Supreme Court evaluated the law for legitimacy and tailoring, 148 finding deficiencies in both. The fee scheme
failed the legitimacy test because it treated the controversial
character of certain ideas as a cost to be regulated. The county
administrator would “examine the content of the message that is
conveyed, . . . estimate the response of others to that content, and
146F

147F

148F

143

Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
See infra Part III.B.2.
145 See SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 15–17 & nn.140–57 (2019), https://perma.cc/Y65U-FDLF
(describing the circuit courts’ use of traditional tiers of scrutiny and collecting numerous
cases); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of
the Right to Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1486–96 (2018). Note that, as
Professors Ruben and Blocher describe, courts may often apply this logic without explicitly
flagging that they are doing so. Id. at 1487.
146 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
147 Id. at 126.
148 Id. at 130 (explaining that the law “must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest”).
144
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judge the number of police necessary to meet that response.” 149
Thus, unpopular ideas incurred higher fees. But the freedom to
express disagreeable ideas is a benefit the First Amendment protects, so disagreeableness cannot legitimately be treated as a social cost to be reduced by regulation. 150 The county responded that
it did not illegitimately treat controversial ideas qua ideas as
costly, but rather focused on the secondary effect of people’s response to them. 151 But since at least its ruling in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 152 the Court has held that listeners’ disorderly response to
unpopular speech is usually not a legitimate reason to regulate
speech, either. 153
Forsyth County’s fee scheme’s tailoring was also woefully deficient. “The decision how much to charge for police protection or
administrative time—or even whether to charge at all—[was] left
to the whim of the administrator.” 154 The record showed that the
administrator’s fees varied wildly, adhering to neither “articulated standards” nor “objective factors.” 155 The resulting incongruence between social costs regulated and constitutional burdens imposed supplied a further justification for striking down the law. 156
This need not be—and has not been—the fate of all fees imposed on speakers. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 157 the Court upheld
a law “contain[ing] much of the same language as” the later ordinance in Forsyth. 158 The key difference was that, although that
law imposed “a permit fee for the ‘maintenance of public order,’”
149F

150F

15F

152F

153F

154F

15F

156F

157F

158F

149 Id. at 134 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)).
150 Id. at 134–35; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400, 404, 407 (1989).
151 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134.
152 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
153 Id. at 444. Brandenburg forbids penalizing speech because of listeners’ potential
response unless the speech is “directed to inciting . . . imminent lawless action and is
likely” to do so. Id. at 447. The “directed to” language heads off any potential for shutting
down speech via a “heckler’s veto.” See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,
71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416–17 (1986). The Brandenburg rule currently applies only in the
First Amendment context, but one could imagine it migrating elsewhere to head off similar
moral hazards.
For another example of a tax on speech that failed the legitimacy test, see Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983).
There, because the tax singled out the press, the legitimacy requirement was heightened,
requiring a “compelling” governmental goal. Id. at 585. The state’s asserted goal—raising
revenue—was not important enough. Id. at 586.
154 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 133.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
158 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 136 (citing Cox, 312 U.S. 569).
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it did not “charg[e] a premium in the case of a controversial political message delivered before a hostile audience.” 159 The intuition
here is that any demonstration—controversial or not—can generate costs. Protestors may make a mess, spill into streets, divert
traffic, provide cover for opportunist crime, or become unruly.
These costs are legitimately regulable; “[t]here is nothing contrary to the Constitution in the charge of a fee limited to [such]
purpose[s].” 160
To avoid Forsyth’s tailoring problem, regulators can size fees
to reflect reasonable estimates of these legitimate costs. They
may vary rates based on crowd size or the length of the event. 161
They may also account for location, route, date, or time of day. 162
Adhering to these principles, many cities and counties currently
do impose cost-internalizing fees on public demonstrations. Every
circuit to consider the issue has determined that such well-tailored
fees are consistent with the First Amendment. 163
159F

160F

16F

162F

163F

2. Strict and relaxed legitimacy and tailoring.
Regulations of speech extend far beyond licensing fees for
demonstrations. A wide-ranging set of First Amendment cases
shows that legitimacy and tailoring drive constitutional analysis
for regulations of many types. These cases also show how the
stringency of legitimacy and tailoring requirements can ramp up
or down, depending on the character of the law under review.

159

Id. at 136 (quoting Cox, 312 U.S at 577).
Cox, 312 U.S. at 577.
161 Id. at 575–77.
162 See, e.g., Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1135 (6th Cir. 1991);
Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 F.3d 346, 366 (5th
Cir. 2010).
163 See Int’l Women’s Day March, 619 F.3d at 366; Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511
F.3d 16, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2007); S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson City, 372 F.3d 1128, 1140–41
(9th Cir. 2004); Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219
F.3d 1301, 1322–24 (11th Cir. 2000); MacDonald v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 362–63
(7th Cir. 1997) (denying a preliminary injunction); Stonewall Union, 931 F.2d at 1134–36;
cf. Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is beyond
peradventure that a city can establish a permit scheme whose goal is to ‘assure financial
accountability for damage caused by’ an event.” (quoting Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534
U.S. 316, 322 (2002))); Transp. Alts., Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting that such fees can “clearly” be “consistent with the First Amendment”).
160
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The constellation of speech regulations that the Court views
as “content-neutral” 164 are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny’s moderate legitimacy and tailoring requirements. 165 Such
laws, for example, regulate the time, place, and manner of expression, or they impinge on First Amendment–protected benefits
only incidentally. 166 These laws pass the legitimacy test if they
target social costs that the government has a “substantial,” “important,” or “strong” interest in reducing. 167 As for tailoring, they
are invalid if the “[g]overnment [has] regulate[d] expression in
such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech
does not serve to advance its goals.” 168 Such laws, however, “need
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of” avoiding
those costs. 169
“Substantial” or “important” regulatory goals include, for example, reducing costly “secondary effects of adult theaters”—e.g.,
“prevent[ing] crime, protect[ing] the city’s retail trade, [and]
maintain[ing] property values.” 170 A zoning law designed to reduce those costs is well-tailored if it “affect[s] only that category
of theaters shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects.” 171
The cost of “unwelcome noise” from loud outdoor concerts likewise
clears the legitimacy hurdle. 172 And a law requiring musicians to
use a city-employed sound technician is sufficiently tailored to
those ends. 173
164F

165F

16F

167F

168F

169F

170F

17F

172F

173F

164 For an analysis of the Court’s difficulty distinguishing between content-neutral
and content-based laws, see generally Lakier, supra note 104. If Professor Lakier is right,
and the Roberts Court takes a broad view of what counts as content-based, the stricter
legitimacy and tailoring standards described below will apply more often.
165 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47–54
(1987). As Professor Stone argues, multiple tiers of stringency may be embedded in intermediate scrutiny. Id. The truth might even be that there is a sliding scale of stringency
between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.
166 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
167 Stone, supra note 165, at 48–50; see also, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (“substantial”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (“important”); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620,
636 (1980) (“strong”).
168 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); see also Stone, supra
note 165, at 48–49.
169 Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
170 City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 (emphasis omitted).
171 Id. at 52.
172 Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984)).
173 Id. at 800.
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But a municipality may not require a permit before residents
are allowed to engage in door-to-door advocacy. 174 Potential social
costs from such advocacy—fraud, crime, intrusions on privacy—
are “important” enough to clear a moderate legitimacy hurdle. 175
But when the permit requirement would substantially burden expression, 176 while working little reduction in these costs, 177 it fails
to strike “an appropriate balance between the affected speech and
the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to
serve.” 178 A ban on all speech near abortion clinics similarly fails
the tailoring test. 179 It places heavy burdens on speech, yet makes
few improvements on harassment or public safety that could not
be made by other laws unrelated to speech. 180
Content-based regulations of speech are subject to stringent
legitimacy and tailoring requirements—usually formulated in
terms of traditional strict scrutiny. Here, a merely important or
substantial social cost cannot satisfy the legitimacy requirement.
Instead, the law must target a cost that the government has a
“compelling” interest in regulating. 181 Tailoring then demands
that the proportionality between social costs avoided and protected benefits burdened be narrow. 182 The law is also invalid if
there are “less restrictive alternatives [that] would be at least as
effective in achieving the [statute’s] legitimate purpose.” 183
The “negative impact” of a “graphic image . . . on a young
child,” for example, constitutes a compelling cost. 184 But a law
banning adult cable programming during daytime hours is insufficiently tailored when existing scrambling technology already
eliminates most such costs. 185 Then, the law’s heavy burden on
protected benefits, like expression, far outweighs its benefits. 186
174F

175F

176F

17F

178F

179F

180F

18F

182F

183F

184F

185F

186F

174 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
168–69 (2002).
175 Id. at 164–65.
176 Id. at 165–68.
177 Id. at 165, 168–69.
178 Id. at 165.
179 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 496–97 (2014).
180 Id. at 490–94.
181 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
182 Id.
183 Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
184 Id. at 826.
185 Id. at 819–21.
186 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
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Moreover, voluntary, customer-requested blocking would constitute a “less restrictive alternative” for achieving similar effects—
another failure of tailoring. 187
Some commentators have suggested that strict scrutiny does
not actually turn on the proportionality between regulations’ important goals and their constitutional burdens. Professor Gerald
Gunther famously claimed that such review is “‘strict’ in theory
and fatal in fact”—that laws triggering it are, in effect, categorically unconstitutional. 188 But this is a misconception. Professor
Adam Winkler has shown empirically that in about 30% of all federal cases—and 22% of free speech cases—laws subjected to strict
scrutiny survive. 189 And as recently as 2010, the Supreme Court
upheld a content-based ban on speech that provides “material
support” to terrorist organizations. 190 It held that “combating terrorism” was a social benefit “of the highest order.” 191 The law was
also narrowly tailored—despite prohibiting support for nonviolent
activity—because, the Court thought, such support is actually
quite costly. It “frees up other resources” and “lend[s] [terrorist
organizations] legitimacy,” thus furthering their “violent ends.” 192
187F

18F

189F

190F

19F

192F

3. Legitimacy and tailoring analysis in putatively
categorical rules.
In some situations, First Amendment rules do appear facially
categorical—eschewing the proportionality analysis inherent in
tailoring. This Section shows how legitimacy and tailoring can
undergird even such doctrines.
The First Amendment rules governing defamation are a good
example. After Sullivan, a public official can recover for defamation only if the alleged defamer acted with “actual malice.” 193 This
rule is facially categorical; recovery is allowed if the defendant
knew of or recklessly disregarded their statement’s falsity but not
if the defendant did not. 194
193F

194F

187

Id.
Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
189 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796, 844 (2006).
190 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 30.
193 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
194 Id. Note that, for defamation not involving a public figure, the mens rea requirement is lower. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–49.
188
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Defamation targets social costs—reputational damage from
false speech—that pass the legitimacy test. 195 But before Sullivan, defamation had a serious tailoring problem. In Sullivan, an
Alabama police commissioner sued the New York Times for making misstatements about the police’s violent break up of civil
rights protests. 196 The misstatements were utterly trivial, doing
little if any harm to the commissioner. 197 In fact, the commissioner
was not even mentioned—either by name or title. 198 Despite this,
Alabama’s defamation regime allowed—with negligible mens
rea requirements—a jury to impose damages on the Times of
half a million dollars. 199 That would be roughly $4 million today. 200
A regime that imposes such huge burdens on expression for
the purpose of avoiding negligible costs fails the tailoring test.
The threat of astronomical damages deters risk-averse speakers
from speaking on issues of public importance, even when they
have taken reasonable precautions against falsity. 201 And the “actual malice” rule is best understood as a remedy for such poor
tailoring. Purposeful and reckless lies are likely to be especially
costly, since they are often intended to injure. Thus, limiting liability to just those cases allows heavy constitutional burdens only
in exchange for presumptively large reductions in cost. Moreover,
when speakers already know that their speech will be inaccurate,
they can correct it before publication, avoiding liability without
much constitutional burden.
This explanation of the “actual malice” rule is borne out by
the Court’s subsequent decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 202
There, the Court held that defamation liability may be imposed
without “actual malice” if the plaintiff is not a public official or
figure. 203 But in such cases, the plaintiff “may recover only such
195F

196F

197F

198F

19F

20F

201F

20F

203F

195 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (affirming “the state interest in compensating injury to
the reputation of [public and] private individuals”).
196 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57.
197 The paper misstated, for example, which patriotic song protestors sang and what
precise formation the police stood in. Id. at 258–59.
198 Id. at 289.
199 Id. at 256, 262. The jury did not differentiate between actual and punitive damages. Id. at 284.
200 This inflation adjustment was calculated in April 2021 using U.S. Inflation Calculator, https://perma.cc/R2FA-AZJG.
201 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278–89 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford 1947)).
202 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
203 Id. at 347–49.
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damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.” 204
That is, the damages must be well-tailored, with the constitutional burden mimicking actual social costs. Tailored damages
mitigate concerns about “media self-censorship” by risk-averse
speakers. 205 Yet, as in Sullivan, the rule leaves open the possibility of particularly high constitutional burdens—punitive damages—for statements made with “actual malice.” This, the Court
reiterated, was because such statements are more likely to constitute particularly harmful “reprehensible conduct.” 206
Thus, Sullivan’s apparently categorical “actual malice” rule
is best understood as enshrining a particular judgment about how
to ensure proportionality in a species of speech-regulating law.
Rather than perform the proportionality analysis in every new
defamation case involving a public official, the Court did it once
and applied the result going forward. Blocher calls this process
“common law categoricalism.” 207 But, as with all standards that
have calcified into rules, changed circumstances could precipitate
a swing back in the other direction, toward case-specific proportionality review. 208
204F

205F

206F

207F

208F

C.

A Social-Cost Picture of Individual Rights

If legitimacy and tailoring drive the constitutional analysis—
as they do in these two doctrinal areas 209—what do rights amount
to? Is a constitutional right worth anything at all if it allows the
209F

204

Id. at 350.
Id.
206 Id. One might wonder why the Gertz rule should not apply in all cases, allowing
recovery of actual damages upon a showing of negligence, even when the plaintiff is a
public official. That would seem to allow more recovery for legitimate defamatory harm
while maintaining tight proportionality in no-malice cases. Recall, however, that the jury
in Sullivan did not differentiate, when imposing its colossal award, between actual and
punitive damages. See supra note 199. This suggests that juries cannot always be trusted
to accurately calculate actual damages. Perhaps the Court believed that they should not
be trusted in high-constitutional-stakes cases involving public officials—like Sullivan’s
clash over civil rights.
As for why punitive damages should ever pass the tailoring test, there are two potential reasons. First, they might compensate plaintiffs for certain real harms that are hard
to calculate on a line-item basis. Second, they might offset some underenforcement of defamation laws, and thus be well-tailored in expectation.
207 Blocher, supra note 112, at 430–31.
208 Imagine, for example, that a state imposed $100 million in statutory damages for
all reckless misstatements, even if trivial. Surely this would merit a case-specific tailoring
inquiry, Sullivan notwithstanding.
209 Their application in a third area is discussed in Part IV.D, infra.
205
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core benefits it protects to be bartered away for reductions in social cost?
Under the view advanced here, individual constitutional
rights function to limit and then channel tradeoffs between constitutional benefits and other social goods. This provides substantial protections for the constitutional benefits. First, the legitimacy requirement imposes categorical restrictions on the goals at
which regulation may aim. What constitutes a social cost, as opposed to a benefit the constitution protects, is a contestable—and
historically contested—question. 210 The first layer of the legitimacy analysis resolves such contests and flatly bans any law that
wrongly treats a constitutional good as a social ill. 211
The second layer of the legitimacy analysis places an additional thumb on the scale for constitutionally protected benefits.
Even when a law targets an effect that is sometimes legitimately
regulable, such laws still burden protected benefits. Depending
on the burden’s weight, the legitimacy requirement will ask about
the importance of the regulated cost. Particularly large or odious
burdens demand particularly important costs. 212 A total ban on
some important species of protected activity may trigger a heightened legitimacy requirement. 213 So may a law that singles out protected activity in a suspicious way. 214
This prevents governments from imposing odious constitutional burdens to reduce qualitatively trivial, but quantitatively
substantial, costs. Regulators presumably could not, for example,
ban all radio broadcasting, even if it could be proved that the electromagnetic waves gave everyone occasional mild headaches. The
social cost of headaches, even if large in the aggregate, is not sufficiently important to warrant such an odious First Amendment
burden. 215
210F

21F

21F

213F

214F

215F

210 See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392 (examining whether racist speech may be treated
as inherently costly).
211 See, e.g., id. at 392 (“The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences
[against certain ideas] must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on
the basis of its content.”). This comports with Greene’s observation that constitutional
rights should operate categorically—as opposed to proportionally—when “courts must defend the very existence of individual rights against government bigotry, intolerance, or
corruption.” Greene, supra note 108, at 128.
212 See Blocher, supra note 102, at 345.
213 See generally, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Playboy, 529 U.S. 803; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
214 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411–12.
215 Such a ban might also fail the tailoring test. But that would depend on how much
First Amendment benefit was lost, given the availability of alternatives like internet
broadcasting.
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In addition to categorical restrictions on what regulators may
treat as a cost to be regulated, constitutional rights limit how
those costs can be traded off against protected benefits. The tailoring requirement ensures that laws do not sacrifice lots of protected benefit in exchange for small reductions in social costs—
even very important ones. The requisite proportionality varies depending on the law under review. When the legitimacy analysis
is heightened, so too is the tailoring requirement strengthened.
Strict scrutiny thus requires “narrow” proportionality, 216 with
very little excess constitutional burden. 217 But a law that imposes
a less serious aggregate burden on protected benefits may survive
if it is merely “substantially” tailored. 218 This again places a
thumb on the scale for protected benefits, giving lawmakers more
berth when they regulate with a light constitutional touch.
Here, a puzzle arises. What is the right unit of analysis for
the proportionality inquiry? Consider, for example, the limited
firearms bans—such as possession by the mentally ill—that Heller
endorsed. 219 If the right unit were the individual, such laws would
surely be unconstitutional. Statistically speaking, they certainly
apply to at least one person who, in the end, poses little or no
threat of gun violence. Alternatively, imagine a ban on another
group of people, each of whom derives fifty units in protected benefits from owning a firearm. Assume that it is obvious to legislators and the courts that half of them will impose one hundred
units in gun-related social costs, while the other half will impose
zero units. Then, across the whole population, the average constitutional burden of fifty units precisely matches the average reduction in social costs. But this nevertheless seems like a proportionality problem, since the law is plainly overinclusive. The
answer, then, must lie somewhere in the middle. Proportionality
must be analyzed across populations affected by a given set of
regulatory requirements. But it must also require—with varying
216F

217F

218F

219F

216

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
See FALLON, supra note 102, at 60–62. Note that the Court also sometimes strikes
down laws for being underinclusive—regulating costs from protected activity but ignoring
similar ones from nonprotected activity. Id. One can understand such underinclusivity as
demonstrating regulations’ illegitimate goals. Blocher, supra note 102, at 369–70. This
test, however, is tricky to apply, and the court does so inconsistently. See FALLON, supra
note 102, at 60–62. For example, regulations on one category of costly speech do not necessarily evince illegitimate motives simply because they fail to restrict other similarly
costly speech. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 202–03 (1983).
218 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
219 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
217
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strictness—that lawmakers draw their regulatory categories so
as to minimize errors within them. That this principle remains
unclear in the case law reflects a general lack of quantitative sophistication with which regulations of protected activity are
promulgated and litigated.
In addition to the primary proportionality requirement, tailoring analysis sometimes imposes other rights-protective side
constraints. For example, strict scrutiny dooms even wellproportioned laws if another regulation would achieve the same
reduction in social cost while imposing a smaller constitutional
burden. 220 That this requirement usually applies only under
higher levels of scrutiny could reflect a judgment about institutional competencies. Legislators may generally be better positioned than judges to assess the relative cost-reducing potential
of different regulations. But when the constitutional stakes are
high, judges feel empowered to second-guess those assessments.
In sum, under this Article’s model, constitutional rights protecting individual activity are neither absolute nor trivial. Regulators may impose constitutional burdens for the sake of other societal goals. But the Constitution limits both what tradeoffs they
may make and how. Occasionally, as explored below, the Constitution may even limit the maximum tradeoff permissible, including for well-tailored regulations of important social costs. 221 This
constraint is much less pervasive in current doctrine than those
discussed above, but there are reasons—including distributional
justice—to advocate its expansion. 222
20F

21F

2F

IV. WHY PIGOUVIAN TAXES OUTPERFORM TRADITIONAL
REGULATIONS
Now, finally, we have the tools to assess the constitutional
advantages of Pigouvian taxes over traditional regulation. As discussed above, in at least two key areas of conflict between regulation and constitutional protection—guns and speech—a prime difficulty has been tailoring. 223 This Part shows how, in such cases,
Pigouvian taxation can overcome tailoring problems and enable
regulation of the social costs lawmakers care about most. It also
illustrates a limiting case. Pigouvian taxes are unlikely to resolve
23F

220

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
See infra notes 417–18 (discussing this principle in the rules governing time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech).
222 See infra notes 417–18.
223 See supra Part III.A–B.
221
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the legitimacy-based conflict at the heart of the debate over regulating abortion.
A.

The Inherent Advantages of Pigouvian Taxes over
Traditional Regulation

Why are traditional regulations so difficult to adequately tailor? And why should we expect Pigouvian taxes to fare better?
There are two primary reasons, and they mirror the reasons that
economists prefer Pigouvian taxes to traditional command-andcontrol rules.
First, recall that, to impose a command-and-control rule, lawmakers must estimate both the benefits and the costs of the regulated activity. 224 For purposes of pure efficiency, the lawmaker
should try to evaluate all benefits and costs. But what matters for
constitutional tailoring is proportionality between constitutionally protected benefits and the regulation’s targeted social costs.
Underestimate protected benefits or overestimate targeted costs,
and you end up with a constitutional tailoring problem.
Not every estimation error will be fatal. As discussed above,
the Constitution’s tailoring requirements vary by context. 225 Laws
that only lightly impinge on protected benefits need not be as
tightly proportioned as those that more heavily impinge. 226 But
the need for two estimates presents two opportunities to go
astray.
This problem is especially acute when regulators do not know
what benefits the Constitution protects. For example, the Supreme Court has, so far, been silent about whether the Second
Amendment protects benefits from, say, hunting in addition to
self-defense. 227 In the face of such uncertainty, how should lawmakers tailor regulations on hunting rifles? The only option is to
make a guess about protected benefits, enact a law based on that
guess, and wait to see if the courts strike it down.
Pigouvian regulators, by contrast, need not estimate how
much private constitutionally protected benefit people derive
from engaging in a given activity. To set the right Pigouvian tax,
they need to estimate only the marginal targeted social costs the
24F

25F

26F

27F

224

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.C.
226 See supra Part III.C.
227 See Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
133, 134–35, 134 n.5 (2015).
225
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activity generates, and set the tax at that amount. 228 If properly
sized, the constitutional burden of a Pigouvian tax is not merely
proportional to its targeted social costs; the two are identical. This
presents just one opportunity to go wrong. Moreover, it does not
require regulators to know everything that the Constitution does
protect, only that it doesn’t protect their particular targeted costs.
And existing case law supplies much information about the latter.229
Regulators promulgating Pigouvian taxes might sometimes
misestimate costs. And such errors might sometimes produce tailoring problems. However, between estimating targeted social
costs and estimating constitutionally protected benefits, the former is less likely to go wrong. Regulators are often most concerned with highly visible harms—things like physical injuries
and monetary losses. As detailed below, existing legal and social
scientific tools provide well-established and constitutionally acceptable—if metaphysically imperfect—methods for measuring
these familiar costs. 230 And such costs are at least easier to measure than, say, the intangible constitutionally protected benefit of
freely speaking one’s mind. Moreover, if a social cost turns out to
be difficult to estimate, Pigouvian regulators can simply ignore it.
They can measure what is measurable and set the tax rate accordingly. This may result in less-than-perfect efficiency, but that
is not a constitutional problem. 231 Command-and-control regulators have no such luxury when it comes to estimating protected
benefits. The proportionality inquiry does not let them simply ignore their law’s effect on some benefit simply because it is difficult
to quantify.
Even more problematic for command-and-control regulators
is transmuting cost-benefit estimates into legal rules. There are
really only ever two choices: ban an activity, or allow it. 232 To be
sure, not all bans are as far-reaching as, for example, the neartotal ban on handguns at issue in Heller. They can be much more
targeted—applying only to certain people, at certain times, engaging in protected activity in a certain manner. A background
28F

29F

230F

231F

23F

228

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III. In the cases discussed there, the Court has enumerated many
legitimately regulable social costs, which are thus not protected.
230 See infra Part IV.C.
231 For more on this, see infra Part IV.C.
232 Command-and-control rules requiring precautions can also be understood this
way. Then, the relevant ban is on precautionless activity. And the proportionality question
asks whether the decision to forego precautions imposes, on the margin, more social cost
than constitutionally protected benefit.
229
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check for gun purchases, for example, operates as a ban on ownership for those who fail the check. Such microbans must, by practical necessity, apply to categories of people or activity: “no gun
sales to people under 18 years of age,” “no protests on the highway,” and so on. 233
The task, then, is this: To impose proportionate, well-tailored
command-and-control rules, lawmakers must identify coherent
categories of activity for which social costs likely outweigh protected benefits. But what if costs are diffuse and hard to predict,
such that identifying such categories is difficult or impossible? All
gun ownership carries the risk of an accidental shooting. And
every accidental shooting is extremely costly. But they happen to
only a small fraction of gun owners. Thus, the average per capita
expected cost from accidental shootings is likely quite low—too
low to justify any serious broad-based restriction. Nor is it clear
that lawmakers have any good way of predicting accidents. Without that predictive information, they will not be able to identify any
significant categories of gun owners for whom expected costs exceed
benefits—categories that would enable substantial regulation.
Sometimes, small categories of particularly costly activity
can be identified and banned via a command-and-control rule.
But such bans are likely to be quite narrow, thus leaving the vast
majority of cost-imposing activity unregulated. For example, assault weapons may be particularly dangerous, and thus bannable.
But even if so, they are used in only a miniscule percentage of
homicides and suicides. 234 Thus, even a perfectly enforced assaultweapons ban with no substitution of guns could, by its own terms,
reduce gun-related costs by only about 2%. 235 The rest of the costs
remain completely untouched by regulation.
Additional rules, even if similarly narrow, might aggregate
to greater effect. But still, their maximum scope remains limited.
23F

234F

235F

233 But see generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401 (2017) (positing that, in the future, artificial intelligence
might deliver legal directives in the form of individualized, second-by-second commands).
234 Koper et al., supra note 52, at 2; Christopher S. Koper, William D. Johnson, Jordan
L. Nichols, Ambrozine Ayers & Natalie Mullins, Criminal Use of Assault Weapons and
High-Capacity Semiautomatic Firearms, 95 J. URB. HEALTH 313, 318 (2018) (homicides);
see also Steven Stack & Ira Wasserman, Gender and Suicide Risk: The Role of Wound Site,
39 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 13, 18 tbl.4, 19 (2009) (indicating that 13% of
suicides involved rifles, of which assault rifles are a small subset).
235 Koper et al., supra note 52, at 314.
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Consider that federal law already makes it illegal for anyone previously convicted of any felony to possess a gun. 236 This includes
the 52.3% of felons who committed nonviolent drug, property, and
other crimes. 237 Yet, even if this broad prohibition were perfectly
enforced, it would prevent gun possession for only about 30%–
40% of people eventually convicted of homicide. 238 In turn, homicides account for at most about 38% of annual gun deaths; gun
suicide rates are nearly twice as high. 239 Such scant regulatory
coverage, likely touching only a small fraction of costly activity,
may be the best we can do using command-and-control rules. That
is because lawmakers are running out of identifiable categories of
people whose gun use could be constitutionally restricted. For example, people between the ages of 18 and 21 commit their fair
share of gun crimes. 240 But, as Professor Michael Dorf has recently
argued, a law banning gun ownership for everyone under 21
would be unlikely to survive constitutional tailoring analysis. 241
Pigouvian regulators do not face this problem. Pigouvian
taxes are not bans, or even microbans. Under them, anyone who
determines that the protected benefits from an activity exceed social costs is free to engage in that activity. And the regulatory
regime remains well tailored so long as the Pigouvian tax rate
approximates targeted social costs. As a result, lawmakers are
not limited to regulating only those tiny slivers of activity where
costs identifiably exceed protected benefits. Even in cases where
costs are widespread but individually unpredictable, the solution
is straightforward: tax everyone on an expected-cost basis, and
let people themselves decide how to act in response. Pigouvian
taxes can therefore regulate up to 100%—not 2% or 15%—of
cost-producing activity.
236F

237F

238F

239F

240F

241F
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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Incarcerated Felon Population by Type of Crime Committed, PROCON (Jan. 28,
2015), https://perma.cc/8D9J-5QRH.
238 Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Anthony A. Braga, Criminal Records of Homicide
Offenders, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 598, 599–600 (2005).
239 EVERYTOWN, EveryStat, EVERYSTAT, https://perma.cc/DG9S-73WP. It is possible
that many suicides are committed by people who illegally possess firearms. But I was able
to locate no research to this effect. Moreover, it seems dubious, given our laws’ primary
focus on banning possession by convicted felons. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g). It is at
least intuitive to predict that the correlation between prior felonies and homicides is much
stronger than between prior felonies and suicide.
240 Vittes et al., supra note 236, at 28.
241 Michael C. Dorf, Do 18 Year Olds Have a Constitutional Right to Guns?, TAKE
CARE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/E4UP-5TR7.
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Moving on, Pigouvian taxes are dynamic enough to be well
tailored even under tests requiring the least burdensome regulatory alternative. If a Pigouvian tax is well-keyed to actual social
costs, it allows—indeed, incentivizes—taxed entities to find the
least burdensome way to reduce those costs. Think, for example,
of a smart gun that can be fired only by its owner. 242 Such a precaution, if cheap and effective, could work significant reductions
in social cost with small constitutional burdens. A command-andcontrol rule can reap this welfare-enhancing benefit only if a
smart gun requirement is written explicitly into the law. 243 But
under a well-designed Pigouvian tax, taxed entities will seek out
such precautions—or even invent new ones—whether or not the
law explicitly contemplates them. 244 So long as taxes follow
costs, 245 a Pigouvian tax will simulate the least burdensome command-and-control regime, whatever that would be.
Traditional regulations aside from command-and-control
rules also suffer from tailoring problems that Pigouvian taxes can
avoid. Tort regimes like the one overturned in Sullivan can impose constitutional burdens far in excess of reductions in social
cost. This is because of shortcomings in institutional competence.
Juries theoretically peg compensatory damages to social costs.
But they can be biased. Their racial prejudices might, for example, produce immense awards for trivial false statements made by
Black civil rights leaders. 246 Or, as laypeople, they might be less
well-equipped than experts to accurately evaluate social costs,
even when acting in good faith. 247 Pigouvian tax rates, by contrast, can be set by experts using established social scientific techniques designed to produce the best available estimates of social
cost. 248 Such expert calculations are certain to contain some inaccuracies. But they would be careful, systematic, and public,
24F
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24F

245F

246F

247F

248F

242 See Michael Ram, Technology of Safety Devices for Firearms, 12 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 218, 221 (2000).
243 See supra Part II.A.
244 See supra Part II.A.
245 See infra Part V.A.2.
246 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
247 See generally, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A.
SCHKADE & W. KIP VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002). See also
Michael J. Saks, Lisa A. Hollinger, Roselle L. Wissler, David Lee Evans & Allen J. Hart,
Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 244–45 (1997)
(surveying the literature and finding that, while jury awards roughly track actual losses,
“both systematic and random errors make the [jury] process less than satisfactory”).
248 See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.
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whereas jury awards are not. Moreover, even the strictest constitutional tailoring requirements do not require laws to estimate
social costs with metaphysical perfection. 249 If it were otherwise,
there could be no extant examples of permissible regulations on
protected activity. But many such examples exist, 250 despite being
based, as they are, on imperfect cost estimates.
249F

250F

B.

Two Promising Cases: Guns and Fake News

Pigouvian taxes will generally fare better under the tailoring
analysis than traditional regulations of constitutionally protected
activities. But what about specific taxes? Here, we return to our
hypothetical Pigouvian taxes on guns and fake news. This Section
argues that a well-crafted version of each would avoid the pitfalls
of its forebears and thus be upheld as constitutional.
Begin with the dual-layered legitimacy test. 251 The important
point here is that both the fake news and the gun taxes would
target costs whose legitimacy the Supreme Court has already approved. In its case law evaluating the taxes’ traditional analogues, the Court has identified some costs as truly distinct from
constitutionally protected benefits. And it has opined on the importance of those costs. In both cases, we should expect the social
costs at which our Pigouvian taxes are aimed to easily pass the
legitimacy threshold.
The Pigouvian tax on guns would target social costs from accidental and intentional shootings. More specifically, the tax
would be imposed in an amount equal to losses—like injury,
death, and lost wages—resulting from crimes, accidents, and suicides. These are surely the kinds of harms the Heller majority
had in mind when it approved the regulation of “handgun violence
in this country.” 252 At least, they are the kinds of harms targeted
by the many longstanding regulations on gun ownership that
Heller explicitly endorsed. 253 Laws barring gun ownership by the
mentally ill, the “carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons,” 254
and even garden-variety tort law all attempt to avert such costs.
251F

25F

253F

254F

249
250
251
252
253
254

See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A–B.
Discussed in Part III.C, supra.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
Id. at 627 (quotation marks omitted).

2021]

The Pigouvian Constitution

1123

This implies two things. First, the Pigouvian tax targets costs
distinct from “individual self-defense,” which is “‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment[’s]” protected benefits. 255 To
carefully avoid illegitimately targeting that protected benefit, the
Pigouvian tax should exclude from its rate calculation any costs
resulting from justifiable self-defense. Second, costs from injury
and death are sufficiently important to justify a right-sized tax.
Heller endorsed those costs as important enough to justify odious
burdens like total criminal bans for whole categories of people. 256
All the more, then, should the Court endorse a tax—which is not
a ban, and certainly not a criminal penalty—in service of the
same goals.
One can run a similar analysis on the targeted harms of a
Pigouvian tax on fake news. That tax would be designed to incorporate certain harms from demonstrably false speech—mostly
online—posing as real news. Specifically, the targeted harms
would fall into two categories: damage to reputation and harm
from unwarranted reliance on such lies. As with the gun tax,
these are social costs that the Supreme Court has already approved as targets of traditional regulation. Reputational harm
from false speech is the classic social cost that defamation laws
target. And in its cases following Sullivan, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that such harms are legitimately regulable. 257 Harm to reputations from false claims of fact is thus distinct from the protected benefit of being able to freely express
“pernicious [ ] opinion[s]” and other “ideas.” 258 Moreover, such
costs are sufficiently important to warrant imposing monetary
payments in the form of defamation damages. 259 There is little
reason to think that the imposition of monetary payments in the
form of Pigouvian taxes should be any different.
The same goes for social costs from unwarranted reliance on
false information. These are the classic harms targeted by laws
penalizing fraud. Even though false speech receives some First
25F

256F

257F

258F

259F

255 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).
256 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
257 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (acknowledging “the state interest in compensating
injury to the reputation of [public and] private individuals”).
258 Id. at 339–40.
259 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277–78. Recall that, insofar as tort payments raised a
constitutional concern, it was because of their potential for extreme ill-tailoring. See supra
Part III.B.3.
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Amendment protection, 260 the “legally cognizable harm associated
with [fraud]” justifies its regulation. 261 In a fraud, one party lies
to another to induce an action, the other acts in reliance on the
lie, and the latter is worse off for it. 262 The main act that fake news
has historically attempted to influence is voting. 263 But when fake
news induces people to buy products or financial instruments, a
Pigouvian tax could target those fraudulently induced choices
too. 264 Such harms are at least important enough to justify laws
imposing tort damages in the amount of the harm. 265 So too, then,
are they important enough to justify a Pigouvian tax imposing
similar economic costs.
This brings us to tailoring. As noted above, a right-sized
Pigouvian tax on protected activity is inherently well-tailored. 266
The detriment it imposes on constitutionally protected benefits is
not merely proportional to, but rather identical to, the targeted
social cost. Thus, the baseline assumption should be that a
properly sized 267 Pigouvian tax will withstand scrutiny under any
version of the tailoring test. That assumption is bolstered when one
considers how the Pigouvian taxes proposed here would avoid the
specific tailoring pitfalls that felled their traditional analogues.
Begin this time with the tax on fake news. Recall that both
the fee scheme in Forsyth and the defamation regime in Sullivan
were struck down for poor tailoring. 268 In both cases, the source of
inadequate tailoring was institutional incompetence. The administrator in Forsyth set the permit fees not by carefully estimating
each demonstration’s regulable costs, but rather by “whim.” 269
The jurors in Sullivan allowed their racial animus to infect their
estimation of costs, imposing extraordinarily high damages on
pro-civil-rights criticism of the police. 270
260F

261F

26F

263F

264F

265F
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269F

270F

260

Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721–22.
Id. at 719.
262 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
263 See supra Part I.
264 See Fredrik Vold, Will Bitcoin SV Repeat Pump & Dump of 2019?, CRYPTONEWS
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/3246-M3FQ (describing a fake-news-fueled pump-anddump scam for cryptocurrency).
265 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718–19. Moreover, some fraudulent speech can be punished
criminally. Id. at 720.
266 See supra Part IV.A.
267 For a discussion on how social costs can be measured—and taxes thus properly
sized—see Part IV.C, infra.
268 See supra Part III.B.1, 3.
269 Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 133.
270 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
261

2021]

The Pigouvian Constitution

1125

A Pigouvian tax on fake news would avoid this pitfall by vesting highly competent experts with the authority to measure social
costs and thereby set tax rates. They would rely on well-established
empirical methods. 271 And unlike Sullivan’s jurors or Forsyth’s
administrator, their rationales would be public, stable, and directly reviewable by courts. 272 The goal would be social cost metrics that approached the most accurate available anywhere. Indeed, because the costs targeted by the fake news tax—and the
gun tax—are familiar in law and social science, existing empirical
methods are robust. 273 Such careful estimates would avoid the
wild disproportionality between constitutional burden and social
cost that pervaded Sullivan and Forsyth.
That leaves the problem of risk aversion. Sullivan might be
read as worrying that even accurate damage awards, if sized to
unpredictably large harms from apparently minor misstatements,
could chill valuable speech. The Court solved this problem by imposing an “actual malice” standard, allowing liability only for
those who, in advance, know—or should know—of a serious
risk. 274 Pigouvian taxes can do even better. Consider that, even
under the “actual malice” standard, a known, but apparently trivial, false statement can still produce unexpected and massive
damages. When the defamed turns out to be an eggshell victim,
risk-induced chilling of speech can still arise. But a Pigouvian tax
on costs that vary unpredictably case-to-case can be levied in the
amount of average expected cost, smoothing eggshell-victim effects. 275 Then, costs per instance are both moderate and predictable in advance.
Moreover, there is little risk that a Pigouvian tax limited to
fake news would ensnare diligently reported stories. The line between fake news—utter fabrications presented as accurate—and
genuine news need not be blurry. PolitiFact, for example, keeps a
running scorecard of misleading news stories. 276 Of the stories it
271F
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276F
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See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.A.1.
273 See infra Part IV.C.
274 See supra Part III.B.3.
275 See infra Part V.A.2. This would mimic full insurance. See infra Part V.A.3. As
with insurance, average prices could vary categorically. If, for example, it turned out that
fake political stories systematically impose higher costs than fake stories about celebrities,
then those two categories of fake news—not individual instances of each—would incur
different tax rates.
276 See Fake News, POLITIFACT, https://perma.cc/6965-J7HA.
272
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has evaluated, a whopping 94% fall into its two most blatant categories of inaccuracy—“False” and “Pants on Fire.” 277 A “False”
story might, for example, edit a famous writer’s tweet to favor
Trump, rather than Clinton, by blatantly swapping their two
names. 278 A “Pants on Fire” story might opine on the strictures of
the Constitution’s Twenty-Eighth Amendment, though only
twenty-seven amendments exist. 279 These are not subtle lies.
They could be regulated without much fear of Orwellian governmental overreach. 280 And given such egregious falsehoods’ enormous share of the fake news pie, a Pigouvian tax focused only on
them could still have strong effects. A fake news tax, narrowed in
this way, would in fact approximate the effect of Sullivan’s “actual malice” requirement. Only easily identified lies would incur
a tax.
There is comparatively little to add about the tailoring of a
Pigouvian tax on guns. The law at issue in Heller 281 essentially
forbade everyone from carrying any handgun of any kind. 282 The
tailoring problem there was the same problem with all broad
bans. They indiscriminately destroy constitutionally protected
benefits, banning all protected activity irrespective of reductions
in social costs. And like all right-sized Pigouvian taxes, the gun
tax would incentivize people to refrain from protected activity
only when, by their own lights, costs exceed benefits.
Guns and fake news thus represent exemplary areas where
Pigouvian taxes can succeed, though traditional regulations have
not. They can target costs that are already known to be legitimately regulable. And they would avoid the tailoring problems
that beleaguer their traditional regulatory analogues.
27F
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C.

Measuring Social Costs

The previous sections have argued that right-sized Pigouvian
taxes can effectively reduce the social costs that regulators care
about while overcoming constitutional tailoring problems. Both of
277

Id.
Samantha Putterman, No, Andy Borowitz Didn’t Make Disparaging Statement
About Clinton Voters, POLITIFACT (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/V72Y-4LXM.
279 Samantha Putterman, Viral Meme Makes Up New Constitutional Amendment,
POLTIFACT (Dec. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/TYN8-7XKE.
280 Consider also that existing governmental entities—securities regulators, defamation juries, consumer protection bureaus, etc.—routinely regulate truth and falsity, often
in much closer cases.
281 Similar to the one at issue in McDonald.
282 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
278
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these claims depend on lawmakers’ ability to adequately measure
the targeted social costs from protected activity. If they cannot do
so, and the taxes are set significantly too low or too high, then
either efficiency or constitutional problems can result.
In many important cases—including our promising taxes on
guns and fake news—there should be little concern that the constitutionally mandated cost measurements will prove infeasible.
For our model taxes on guns and fake news, the targeted social
costs are fairly familiar. Our long-established frameworks for estimating them will almost certainly pass constitutional muster.
The Pigouvian tax on guns would aim to reduce social costs
from shootings in the form of bodily injury and death. 283 Bodily
harm and death are among the most often quantified harms in
existence. Not only social scientists but also legal actors—like juries, legislators, agency heads, and even judges—are constantly
trying to measure them. Indeed, they often must do so to resolve
even the most basic tort suit or to design simple safety regulations. The result is a panoply of well-established and oft-employed
models for converting maimings and murders into dollar figures.
Modern estimates of the value of lost life or limb are rooted
in statistical estimates of peoples’ willingness to pay to avoid such
fates. 284 The basic method is to observe how labor and product
prices vary with risk, controlling for as many other factors as possible. 285 Since the 1980s, such estimates have become extremely sophisticated. They rely on increasingly rich and accurate datasets. 286 They differentiate between ways that people might be
injured or killed. 287 And increasingly, such estimates are sensitive
to the imperfections in human risk assessment and decision-making. 288 Despite differences in methodologies, these measurements
substantially converge. Today, the value of a statistical life in the
United States hovers roughly in the $12 million range. 289
Valuing injury costs associated with gun ownership requires
another inferential step. Regulators need to know the relationship between gun ownership and injuries. For example, does increasing gun ownership increase the murder or suicide rate? Or,
283F
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See supra Part III.A.
See generally, e.g., Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a Statistical
Life, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON. & FIN. (2019), https://perma.cc/AKJ3-QT4Z.
285 Id. at “Estimating the VSL”.
286 Id. at “Representative Estimates”.
287 Id. at “How You Die”.
288 Id. at “How Markets May Be More Complex”.
289 Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 284, at “Representative Estimates”.
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in the absence of guns, would the same murders and suicides be
committed by other means? Here, too, there are longstanding social science frameworks for evaluating cause and effect. Most
commonly, researchers use sophisticated statistical analysis to
observe how, controlling for other factors, rates of gun injury and
death vary with rates of gun ownership. 290
These analyses are not merely theoretical. In 2006, social scientists at Duke and Georgetown Universities estimated the annual marginal social cost per gun-owning household to be $600. 291
This estimate is conservative, using low-end figures for the value
of a statistical life and the effect of gun ownership on injuries. 292
A less conservative number would approach $1,800 annually. 293
Both figures include only costs from intentional shootings. 294
Other researchers have attempted to quantify the effects of gun
ownership on other outcomes, like suicide 295 and accidental
deaths. 296 Thus, a conservative Pigouvian tax on gun ownership
might easily exceed $1,000 per household annually. 297 We should
expect more research of this type in the near future. For the first
time in over twenty years, Congress has recently appropriated
federal funding to study the causes of gun violence. 298
The same kind of logic would apply to estimating the social
costs of fake news. As with bodily injury, harms associated with
damaged reputation—lost revenues, job opportunities, etc.—can
be evaluated using traditional tort frameworks. 299 What about the
costs that occur when fake news stories bamboozle people into
making bad decisions? If those decisions are commercial, then
other tools from tort—this time, fraud—will again be instructive. 300
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See generally, e.g., Cook & Ludwig, supra note 45; Duggan, supra note 45.
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292 Id. at 390.
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294 Id. at 390 n.15.
295 See generally, e.g., Mark Duggan, Guns and Suicide, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY:
EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 41, (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (estimating the effect of gun ownership on suicide rates).
296 See generally, e.g., Phillip B. Levine & Robin McKnight, Firearms and Accidental
Deaths: Evidence from the Aftermath of the Sandy Hook School Shooting, 358 SCIENCE
1324 (2017).
297 Cook & Ludwig, supra note 45, at 390.
298 Jessie Hellmann, Congress Reaches Deal to Fund Gun Violence Research for First
Time in Decades, THE HILL (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/B33C-34Z7.
299 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 621, 623 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
300 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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However, as described above, much fake news is designed to
influence voting. 301 How could Pigouvian regulators estimate the
social cost of a fraudulently induced vote? This is again a two-step
procedure. First, regulators would need to determine the likelihood that any given instance of fake news affects a vote. Already,
academics have begun to study how such lies spread online and
the extent to which they affect electoral outcomes. 302 Then comes
the question of how much each fraudulently induced vote is
worth, from a social-cost perspective. Measures of voters’ willingness to pay might be hard to come by. Not often are citizens offered
the opportunity to pay for precautions against being tricked into
voting against their true interests.
Social scientists have, however, begun to measure campaigns’
willingness to pay for a flipped vote, in terms of legitimate advertising expenditures. 303 Bad actors may prefer to influence votes
with fake news instead of legitimate political advertising because
the former is comparatively cheap and easy. The social cost of fake
news can thus be understood as the difference between the cost of
flipping a vote with a lie and the cost of doing it legitimately. This,
too, mirrors a longstanding tort mechanism for regulating antisocial activity: disgorgement, which strips wrongdoers of their illgotten gains. 304
What if regulators wished to use Pigouvian taxes to target
costs from protected activity that are less familiar than those targeted by our sample taxes? 305 As the preceding paragraphs suggest, different costs will invite different measurement frameworks. And there is no guarantee that every conceivable cost will
admit of reasonable estimation. Yet there is good reason to believe
that many will. We live in the legal epoch of cost-benefit analysis
(CBA). Since the Reagan era, administrative agencies have been
required to quantify both the benefits and social costs of major
301F

302F

30F

304F

305F

301

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False
News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1150 (2018); Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 2; Gunther
et al., supra note 61, at 2–6.
303 See generally, e.g., Brett R. Gordon & Wesley R. Hartmann, Advertising Effects in
Presidential Elections, 32 MKTG. SCI. 19 (2013); Jonathan Nagler & Jan Leighley, Presidential Campaign Expenditures: Evidence on Allocations and Effects, 73 PUB. CHOICE
319 (1992).
304 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 13 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2011). See
also generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. 249 (2015).
305 Assume that the costs in question pass the legitimacy threshold.
302
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regulations. 306 In doing so, they often make unusual estimations,
like the cost of a dead fish 307 or, alternatively, of a lost day of recreational fishing. 308 Today, agencies are doing this kind of thing
all the time. Between 2010 and 2013 alone, they issued 106 rules
requiring CBA, resulting in dozens upon dozens of occasionally
complex cost estimates. 309 True, agency CBAs sometimes fall
short, with agencies declining to issue quantitative figures. 310 But
it is quite rare for them to decline because they believe costs or
benefits are unquantifiable “as a matter of principle.” 311 And even
when they do, they may often be wrong. As Professors Jonathan
Masur and Eric Posner have argued, “in all of these cases” between 2010 and 2013, the effects, in fact, “could and should [be]
calculated.” 312
The real constitutional question, then, is not whether some
method will exist for measuring a given targeted cost. One almost
always will. The question instead is which methods are, constitutionally speaking, good enough. Long-established frameworks for
estimating the familiar costs associated with our taxes on guns
and fake news should certainly suffice. When diligently followed,
such tools provide a basis for calculating—for example—accurate
tort damages, which the Constitution blesses in various contexts. 313
Beyond these well-trodden methods, the question is more
open-ended, largely because the Court’s proportionality analyses
have historically been quantitatively unsophisticated. 314 In the
cases described above, the Court approved many regulations as
306F
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Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R 127 (1982) (revoked 1993).
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, D1-3.2 (2004).
308 U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Economic Analysis for the National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category—Phase 1, 9-16 (1997).
309 See Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 100–01 (2016).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 104.
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277–78; Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719; Blocher & Miller,
supra note 10, at 310–13, 334–35.
314 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–64 (2007) (avoiding engagement
with competing empirical claims); City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 (“The First Amendment
does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies or produce [new, city-specific] evidence
. . . so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant.”).
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well-tailored based on little more than gut instinct about the magnitude and distribution of social costs. 315 Rule-of-thumb intuition
is apparently good enough to find proportionality in a flat ban on
gun ownership by all previously convicted felons, despite strong
evidence that many of them pose no elevated threat of violence. 316
We thus ought to expect most good-faith empirical analyses to
likewise suffice. 317 We might think so even if people could reasonably disagree about methodology, and hence about ultimate cost
estimates. 318 In sum, if there are constitutional limits on goodfaith empirical cost estimates, they are not yet well developed. 319
So, regulators can constitutionally promulgate Pigouvian
taxes on protected activity by estimating only targeted costs and
relying on rigorous, but imperfect, good-faith measurements. But
should they? This Article takes the normative position that lawmakers ought to try their best to regulate in light of all the effects
of their rules. Myopic attention to only targeted costs and protected benefits may be constitutionally permissible, but it is not
optimal. 320
The biggest potential challenge for Pigouvian regulators designing all-things-considered, cost-benefit-justified taxes affecting protected activity is accounting for such activity’s positive externalities. 321 Some First Amendment–protected speech, for
315F

316F

317F

318F

319F

320F

321F

315

See supra Part III.A–B.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. Empirical research suggests, for example, that previously convicted felons over fifty pose little threat. See The Effects of Aging on Recidivism
Among Federal Offenders, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 22–27 (2017), https://perma.cc/ENP9-EU4U.
Moreover, many felonies do not involve any violence in the first place. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (mail fraud).
317 Bad-faith empirical analyses are discussed in Part V.A.1, infra.
318 Such disagreements arise everywhere, including in our most well-established cost
estimates. See Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 284, at “Representative Estimates” (describing variation among estimates of the value of a statistical life).
319 See infra Part V.A.1 for more on judicial review of cost estimates.
320 Masur & Posner, supra note 309, at 119–21.
321 As described above, Pigouvian regulators need not estimate private benefits to
regulate efficiently. See supra Part II. And it is a weak argument against regulating that
a Pigouvian tax is too small, having ignored some of an activity’s social costs. Such a tax
improves on the margin over the status quo, and lawmakers can raise rates as they measure additional costs.
So far, this Article has talked in terms of regulating “social costs,” not “negative externalities.” This is because some of the costs targeted by our hypothetical Pigouvian taxes
are rightly considered internalities, not externalities. Suicides fall into this category.
Pigouvian taxes can be efficient if they force an agent to account for such costs—accruing
costs to the agent which she would otherwise ignore. See generally Hunt Allcott & Cass R.
Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 698 (2015).
316
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example, likely produces benefits beyond those for the speaker.
Art is thought to create such prosocial effects. 322 Likewise, it is
sometimes argued that widespread gun ownership acts as a deterrent to crime, such that even non–gun owners experience benefits from guns. 323 If effects like these exist, and are large, taxes
internalizing social costs but ignoring positive externalities
might, on net, reduce social welfare.
Pigouvian taxes should, then, ideally be set to track net social
effects of protected activities. And if a given activity’s positive externalities exceed its costs, the right Pigouvian rate is zero, or
even negative. 324 This is unlikely to be the case for our Pigouvian
tax on guns or fake news. Existing social-scientific efforts to quantify gun costs already focus on net, not gross, effects. 325 The dominant view is now that increasing rates of gun ownership lead to
larger, not smaller, net costs. 326 Unlike other kinds of speech, it
seems unlikely that blatantly false news stories posing as the genuine article generate significant positive externalities.
Not every case will be so easy. What should regulators do if
faced with plausible but hard-to-quantify positive externalities
from protected activity? Should they assume that positive externalities are infinite—swamping costs—and thus refrain from tax32F

32F

324F

325F

326F

This is mostly a pragmatic point, not a constitutional one. The Supreme Court approves of paternalistic regulations on protected activity. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). One might worry that imposing such regulations, including Pigouvian taxes, creates a kind of double penalty. The regulated party
first pays a cost in expectation and then pays again if a bad outcome befalls her. Then, one
would argue, constitutional burdens begin to outweigh targeted social costs. If this were a
constitutional problem, it could again be avoided with Pigouvian regulation. Revenues
from a Pigouvian tax can be redistributed to taxed entities—either in the amount of actual
harm or on an average-cost basis. See Brian Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s
Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: A Review of the Latest “Grand Experiment” in Environmental Policy, 86 ENERGY POL’Y 674, 677 (2015). Such a design preserves the full Pigouvian
incentive.
322 See generally, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005).
323 See generally, e.g., JOHN LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998) (arguing that
gun ownership creates a net reduction in crime).
324 A negative Pigouvian tax is a Pigouvian subsidy. See ROBIN BOADWAY, Challenges
for Second-Best Analysis, in OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY: RETROSPECTIVE AND
PROSPECTIVE VIEWS 185, 206 (2012). For more on the choice between Pigouvian taxes and
subsidies, see generally Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics
in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012).
325 See, e.g., Cook & Ludwig, supra note 45, at 387, 390.
326 See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 45, at 1104–05; Cook & Ludwig, supra note 45, at
390; Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1285 (2003).
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ing? That approach imposes significant opportunity costs by refusing to tackle known harms. The opposite approach—assuming
zero positive externalities and imposing a Pigouvian rate based
on costs alone—incurs costs from lost positive externalities.
Masur and Posner—analyzing administrative rulemaking—
argue that a better approach exists. Advocating a rough Bayesian
method, they contend that lawmakers should rely on the best information they have—even if intuitive or inchoate—to assign values to social costs and positive externalities. 327 The initial valuation should be updated as more information becomes available. 328
This approach produces the regulations most likely to be optimal—
even if error bars are large. 329 Importantly, it avoids the nearly certain mistake of arbitrarily assuming that positive externalities are
either zero or infinite. If, in the end, this best-estimation approach
leaves regulators suspecting a Pigouvian tax may be net welfare
reducing, they should refrain from enacting it. 330
It is worth reemphasizing here that the problem of positive
externalities is mostly pragmatic, not constitutional. Regulators
ought to try to account for them. But neither the constitutional
principles discussed above nor the cases implementing them seem
to suggest that such third-party effects are among the benefits
the Constitution protects. 331 We do not, for example, discount tort
damages for accidental shootings, consistent with the possibility
that widespread gun ownership deters some crimes. And a central
metaphor for understanding free speech is as protecting “the market place of ideas.” 332 A market incentivizes the creation of societal goods by allowing individuals to capture some—but not all—
of the benefits from goods they create. Constitutional rules protecting people’s individual benefits from speaking, but not the
positive externalities they generate, are consistent with this picture. Moreover, the Constitution enshrines additional, independent mechanisms to reward speakers for speech that society deems
327F
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30F

31F
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Masur & Posner, supra note 309, at 119–21.
Id. at 120.
329 Id. at 122.
330 Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 945 (2018). Consider a Pigouvian subsidy. Indeed, in some cases, it
might be feasible to design both a tax keyed to costs and a subsidy keyed to positive externalities. This is more complicated than doing just one or the other, but it creates incentives
for people to improve the ratio of costs to benefits, producing less of the former and more
of the latter.
331 See supra Part III.
332 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
generally MILL, supra note 201.
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especially valuable. Copyright does this for art, patent for science,
and elections do it for political speech. 333
3F

D. A Limiting Case: Abortion
The sections above showed how Pigouvian taxes could be
used to successfully regulate harms from guns and fake news.
This Section, in contrast, demonstrates the proposal’s limitations.
In the case of abortion, Pigouvian taxation is unlikely to resolve
existing tensions between regulation and constitutionality. That
is, Pigouvian taxes would not allow pro-life regulators, who view
the termination of a pregnancy as imposing extreme social costs,
to heavily penalize abortions on that basis. Indeed, it is questionable whether Pigouvian taxation would allow regulators to impose significantly greater restrictions than they have already
achieved using traditional tools. On the contrary, switching from
current regulatory tools to Pigouvian taxes could lead to greater
abortion access, not less.
Begin with the constitutional law of abortion. As with guns
and speech, regulations affecting abortion access live or die by the
legitimacy-tailoring framework. However, unlike with guns or
speech, pro-life lawmakers’ primary obstacle to achieving their
regulatory goals has been legitimacy, not tailoring.
In Roe, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to Texas’s
criminal abortion ban, requiring that it serve “a compelling state
interest” and be “tailored to” that interest. 334 Texas asserted two
statutory goals: protecting prenatal “potential life” and women’s
health. 335 The Court determined that both interests were “important and legitimate.” 336 But the legitimacy hurdle for strict
scrutiny is high. A merely “important” interest is not good
enough.
The Roe Court held that, for most of a pregnancy, the state’s
asserted interests could not justify its ban. It is only “as the
woman approaches term . . . [that] each [interest] becomes ‘compelling.’” 337 In other words, the Court held that the costs of terminating a fetus that could meaningfully live outside its mother’s
body are categorically different from those of terminating a
34F

35F

36F

37F

333
334
335
336
337

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; art. I, § 4; amend. 12.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 165.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 162–63.
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previability pregnancy. 338 A total abortion ban—or a similarly
burdensome regulation—thus passes the legitimacy test only if
limited to postviability procedures. 339
Thus, the legitimacy requirement, not tailoring, clashes directly with pro-life lawmakers’ core regulatory vision. If one’s
view is that the termination of a previability fetus is akin to the
loss of a postnatal human life, then the only satisfying regulations
of abortion will be highly burdensome. And any such restriction
is extremely likely to trigger Roe’s stringent legitimacy requirement, demanding a “compelling” cost. Certainly, pro-life regulators believe that terminating a fetus creates just such a cost.
Whatever the ontological truth, substantive constitutional doctrine dictates otherwise.
Pigouvian taxation is no help here. Suppose that, instead of
Texas’s criminal ban, lawmakers wished to impose a Pigouvian
tax on abortions, either at the locus of the patient or the provider.
If one views the termination of a fetus as akin to the killing of a
person, the right-sized Pigouvian rate is the same for both. Current estimates of the social cost of a lost life converge around
$12 million. 340 Compare a $12 million tax with Texas’s maximum
penalty for providing a requested abortion—five years’ imprisonment. 341 Quite likely, if the latter penalty triggered strict scrutiny’s exacting legitimacy requirement, so would the former. In
either case, the law fails for lack of a “compelling” social cost.
It is true that some command-and-control regulations of
abortion have been struck down because of tailoring, not legitimacy, problems. 342 Certain putative health-and-safety measures
substantially restrict abortion access, while providing a “virtual
absence of any health benefit.” 343 Yet a “virtual absence of . . . benefit” suggests that lawmakers are not really trying to improve
38F
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340F

341F

342F

34F
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Id. at 163–64.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
340 See supra Part IV.C.
341 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 n.1.
342 See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). Because the laws at issue there were less burdensome than those in Roe, Whole Woman’s
Health was subject to the moderate tailoring-legitimacy standard represented in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In June Medical
Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence
disparaged proportionality analysis in the constitutional law of abortion. Id. at 2134–35
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). But he advocated traditional intermediate scrutiny as the correct standard, which, as shown above, includes a proportionality inquiry. See supra
Part III.B.2.
343 June Medical, 149 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313).
339
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safety. Rather, so-called TRAP 344 laws can be used as sub silentio
attempts to impose such heavy regulatory burdens on abortion
providers that they are forced to close. 345 That they have been
struck down demonstrates how the tailoring requirement can
help prevent lawmakers from accomplishing by subterfuge what
they could not do in the open. 346 These setbacks notwithstanding,
TRAP laws appear to have seen significant success. As of 2017,
there were five states with only one abortion provider each and
another eight with two or three. 347
Should lawmakers impose Pigouvian taxes instead of otherwiseconstitutional, health-and-safety rules? Not if their primary goal
is to reduce the number of abortions. If the tax accurately tracks
social cost, it incentivizes healthcare providers to avoid risks as
efficiently as possible. 348 If providers discover a cheaper precaution than the command-and-control rule would have required, the
result will be lower costs for abortions, and thus more, not fewer,
procedures.
Finally, one might wonder whether pro-life lawmakers could
moderate their views of the social costs associated with abortions,
and thereby impose Pigouvian taxes consistent with existing
precedent. After all, Roe does say that protecting “potential life”
constitutes an “important and legitimate,” though not “compelling,” regulatory goal. 349 Perhaps, then, a moderate tax keyed to
this “important” cost, whatever it may be, would withstand the
more relaxed legitimacy inquiry promulgated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 350
The problem here is that, while the Supreme Court has been
adamant that previability “potential life” is not like actual life, it
has scrupulously refused to decide what “potential life” is. This is
34F
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346F

347F

348F

349F

350F

344 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers. See Marshall H. Medoff, State Abortion Politics and TRAP Abortion Laws, 33 J. WOMEN, POL. & POL’Y 239, 240–41 (2012).
345 Id.
346 See FALLON, supra note 102, at 142–45. Of course, not every regulation of abortion
providers is a TRAP law. Consider, for example, a handwashing requirement for surgical
procedures.
347 Rachel K. Jones, Elizabeth Witwer & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2017, GUTTMACHER INST. (2017),
https://perma.cc/XKM5-ZG7Q. Some of the regulations restricting supply may be unconstitutional for the same reason as were those in Whole Woman’s Health. But many may be
valid, imposing serious distributional effects.
348 See supra Part II.
349 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
350 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). The so-called undue burden test applies moderate legitimacy and tailoring requirements to laws imposing lighter constitutional burdens than
the criminal ban at issue in Roe.

2021]

The Pigouvian Constitution

1137

a hard question on which society does not agree. And the case law
offers little guidance. Gonzales v. Carhart 351 is the Supreme Court
case most directly addressing the issue. It held that governments
may, under the auspices of protecting potential life, ban surgical
abortions that might particularly “shock[ ]” the public and
“coarsen society.” 352 But this just confuses things more. On this
view, the value of potential life has nothing to do with the fetus
itself. The identified costs are instead to postnatal humans. Other
holdings further muddy the water. Consider that, in every case
upholding a regulation targeting lost potential life, the Court has
understood the regulation to impose only de minimis burdens on
abortion access. 353 This leaves open the possibility that, whatever
the cost of a lost potential life, it may be quite small. A permissible
Pigouvian tax on abortions, then, would have to be commensurately de minimis.
Without a coherent picture of what lost potential life is,
Pigouvian taxes targeting this cost are highly speculative. Lawmakers could take a guess at what the Court means when it approves such costs as important. But they would be quite likely to
guess wrong. And, in doing so, they might well identify a set of
concerns that failed, under the legitimacy test, to justify their
tax’s burden on constitutionally protected benefits. This is especially likely if the regulatory burden is substantial. Then, regulators would find themselves exactly where they are today—not
with a tailoring problem, solvable via Pigouvian taxation, but
with an intractable legitimacy problem.
These points are generalizable. There are other non-abortionrelated regulatory projects for which Pigouvian taxation would be
of little use. For example, some legislators view hateful speech
directed at vulnerable minority populations as inherently costly.
But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ability to
espouse hateful racial views is among the benefits the First
Amendment protects. 354 Thus, a Pigouvian tax on hate speech qua
351F

352F

35F

354F

351

550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 160, 157.
353 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 166–67; Casey, 112 U.S. at 882–84.
354 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (plurality opinion) (noting
that the First Amendment “protect[s] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate’”
(quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)));
id. at 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A law that can be directed against speech found
offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views
to the detriment of all.”).
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speech would fail at the first stage of the legitimacy test. 355 Mirroring its refusal to elucidate potential life, the Court has not yet
clarified whether the Second Amendment protects benefits associated with hunting. 356 An animal rights–focused legislator who
wished to tax hunting would thus be saddled with similar uncertainties to those arising from any attempt to tax losses of potential life.
35F

356F

V. PRACTICAL AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
So far, this Article has argued for Pigouvian taxation as a
method for effectively and constitutionally regulating perceived
social costs from certain protected activities. But there are challenges, both practical and normative. This Part takes those up.
A.

Practical Challenges
1. Manipulation and judicial review.

The previous Part argued that methods exist for regulators,
acting in good faith, to measure with constitutional sufficiency
the social costs targeted by Pigouvian taxes. But what about bad
faith? Gun-rights advocates, for example, doubtless worry that leftleaning lawmakers promulgating a firearms tax would inflate—intentionally or unconsciously—social-cost estimates, taxing guns
out of existence. Ought we worry here that endorsing “the power
to tax” will, in effect, grant the “power to destroy”? 357
There are three reasons for cautious optimism. First, recent
administrative law scholarship suggests that cost estimates may
not be as easily manipulated as it might appear. 358 The Trump
administration’s executive agencies have blatantly attempted to
manipulate their CBAs in an effort to roll back Obama-era regulations. 359 Despite this, they often succeeded only in “massag[ing]
some of the numbers at the margin,” such that they “could not bring
[themselves] to argue that the [rollbacks] were cost-justified.”360 In
357F

358F

359F

360F

355 When mere speech evolves into a legitimate threat of bodily harm, the story
changes. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment also permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’” (quoting Watt v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))).
356 See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570; McDonald, 561 U.S. 742.
357 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
358 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 70 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1131–32 (2021).
359 Id. at 1114–36.
360 Id. at 1136.
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other instances, where “the Trump EPA did gin up phony CBAs,
[ ] their phoniness is plain to anyone who cares to examine
them.” 361
This leads to the second point: The judiciary can and should
review lawmakers’ social-cost estimates when scrutinizing regulations affecting constitutionally protected activity—Pigouvian or
otherwise. Precisely how exacting such review should be is a difficult question, turning on the balance between agency expertise
and judicial neutrality. 362 At the very least, judicial review can
and does reject laws when lawmakers have made no attempt to
estimate targeted costs. 363 Nor should we worry that courts are
incompetent to disapprove estimates whose “phoniness [is]
plain.” 364 In fact, the mere threat of moderate review may have a
significant restraining effect, including on regulators otherwise
engaged in motivated reasoning. 365
Third, and finally, movement on the margin toward judicial
demands for and review of cost-benefit estimates would improve
constitutional analysis as compared with the current system. The
doctrinal analysis above shows that courts already make judgments about whether regulations’ targeted social costs are proportionate to their burdens on constitutionally protected benefits. 366
But they usually do so based on hunches, rules of thumb, and
heuristics. 367 Such reasoning likely admits even more manipulation than would be possible if lawmakers had to show their work.
Consider again Heller’s unreflective endorsement of firearms
bans for felons, based presumably on an intuition that such individuals are particularly likely to commit violent crimes. 368 That
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Masur & Posner, supra note 330 at 939–40.
363 Cf. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586–
88 (1983) (striking down a tax because regulators refused to even specify, much less attempt to quantify, targeted costs).
364 Masur & Posner, supra note 358, at 1136.
365 Id.
366 See supra Part III.
367 See supra Part III. Note how little of the analysis in these cases involves actual
quantitative estimates. On occasion, when litigants have presented opposing empirical
analyses of a law’s effects, the Court has taken pains to avoid resolving the issue. See, e.g.,
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164.
368 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
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intuition turns out to be false as to certain easily identified subcategories of convicted felons—including those over fifty. 369 Current doctrine, then, endorses an unjustified total deprivation of
Second Amendment rights for an entire category of older convicts—a disproportionate number of whom are Black and
Brown. 370 Pigouvian regulation based on explicit cost estimates
could therefore help increase constitutionally justifiable regulation of protected activity while simultaneously decreasing unjustified deprivations of constitutional rights.
369F

370F

2. Whom to tax, and how.
Assume Pigouvian regulators have identified and measured
a set of legitimately regulable social costs associated with a protected activity. Whom should they tax? And should every taxed
entity pay the same amount? A gun tax, for example, could be
imposed directly on gun owners or indirectly on sellers. It could
be charged on an annual basis or only at the point of sale. It could
be the same for every person and gun or vary with a number of
factors. The values guiding such choices should be efficiency and
administrability.
First, on efficiency, the key point is that Pigouvian taxes
should be designed as well as possible to track actual social
costs. 371 Consider again the classic example of the polluting factory. Assume it generates ten units of pollution per widget. Regulators may be tempted to simply set the tax rate using this ratio
and indefinitely charge on a per-widget basis. But doing so would
create no incentive for technological improvements reducing perwidget pollution. 372 Instead, regulators might install sensors on
the factory’s smokestacks that measure actual pollutant output,
thereby rewarding the factory when its per-widget output falls. If
the smokestack option is too costly—because of technology, fraud,
371F

372F

369 See The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders, supra note 316,
at 22–27; see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud).
370 Darren Wheelock, Collateral Consequences and Racial Inequity: Felon Status Restrictions as a System of Disadvantage, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82, 83 (2005).
371 This point also has a constitutional dimension since, as discussed above, proportionality is best understood as requiring at least modest efforts to reduce errors in allocating constitutional burden. See supra Part III.C.
372 See supra notes 83–85.
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or other factors—regulators could tax using the per-widget estimate but update the rate as technology improves. 373
The hypothetical taxes on guns and fake news could employ
either design, or a mix of the two. Regulators could annually determine, using random sampling, the number of fake-news views
or interactions on Twitter or Facebook. They could tax those companies on a per-view basis, perhaps varying the rate by category
of fake news story. 374 This is a smokestack sensor–style design, so
long as the costs of each view are, in expectation, fairly uniform.
The same would go for a gun tax that, starting on a specified date,
charged gun manufacturers some share of the actual costs caused
by their own guns sold after that date. 375
The gun tax might alternatively be levied, at least in part, on
an estimation basis. A tax on individual firearm owners could be
charged in expectation, rather than after each person’s actual
costs were tallied. But to adequately track social costs, such taxes
should be sensitive to variations in expected cost between categories of gun owners. Existing research on the costs of gun ownership has already begun to account for such variation, quantifying
cost differences between localities. 376 Similar analysis could be
performed to determine, for example, the marginal effects of precautions like trigger locks or gun safety courses on social costs. As
new technology—like “smart guns” 377—emerges, its effects should
be incorporated too.
37F

374F

375F

376F

37F

373 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to
Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002) (discussing Pigouvian rate
updates).
374 Some may object that § 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, passed into law
as part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, would forbid taxing social media companies. That problem is largely outside the scope of this Article, which is concerned with
constitutional strictures. Moreover, § 230 is federal legislation, and it could easily be modified by new federal legislation imposing a fake-news tax. In 2018, Congress modified the
law to allow liability for websites facilitating sex trafficking. See Pub. L. No. 115-164,
§ 3(a), 132 Stat. 1253 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A). And there is bipartisan appetite for
regulating fake news on social media. See Li Zhou, Nancy Scola & Ashley Gold, Senators
to Facebook, Google, Twitter: Wake Up to Russian Threat, POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/G5Y7-FL62. And if states were to attempt the regulation, it is not totally
clear that § 230, which forbids certain “cause[s] of action . . . be[ing] brought,” would apply
to a tax scheme. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
375 Most of the points discussed above regarding 47 U.S.C. § 230 apply also to 15
U.S.C. § 7903 (governing civil liability for gun manufacturers). See supra note 374.
376 Cook & Ludwig, supra note 45, at 389–90.
377 See Cassandra K. Crifasi, Jayne K. O’Dwyer, Emma E. McGinty, Daniel W. Webster
& Colleen L. Barry, Desirability of Personalized Guns Among Current Gun Owners, 57 AM.
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The end result of this estimation-based design is that gun
owners would be sorted into a number of risk tranches. Those
tranches would be charged rates consistent with lawmakers’ best
estimates of expected cost. 378 Certainly, such a system would fail
to perfectly mirror actual costs. Some gun owners might have private information at the time of taxation that they intend to cause
more harm than others similarly situated. 379 But often no one, including owners themselves, will be able to predict intra-tranche
variations. Few people expect to eventually kill themselves or for
their child to accidentally discharge their weapon. In these situations, Pigouvian regulators need not predict the truly unpredictable. Instead, individuals’ cost estimates would equal average expected costs. Then, a Pigouvian tax in the amount of average cost
is well-tailored and induces efficient behavior.
Some scholars have argued that accurately predicting cost
variations is difficult—so difficult as to present a serious efficiency problem for Pigouvian taxation generally. 380 But insofar as
this is a problem, it is one for all modes of regulation, not just
Pigouvian taxes. 381 Moreover, Pigouvian taxes require regulators
to make fewer estimates than alternative tools would. 382 Thus,
there is reason to be confident—or at least as confident as regulators can ever be—that carefully designed Pigouvian taxes would
constitute responsible public policy. 383
To pick from the options for whom to tax, and how, lawmakers should rely on considerations of administrability and efficiency. Ideally, taxes should be levied on entities that are easy to
378F

379F

380F

381F

382F

38F

J. PREVENTIVE MED. 191, 193 (2019) (finding that while 79% of current gun owners support such weapons, few are willing to pay a premium for them). Such research suggests
that a Pigouvian tax, which would make cost-justified precautions cheaper than the alternative, could have a significant effect on adoption.
378 Insofar as readers are wondering whether intra-tranche variation would raise
constitutional concerns, the answer is almost certainly no. The Supreme Court endorses
command-and-control rules governing categories of people for whom harm generally exceeds benefits, even though, for some individuals, the reverse is surely true. See supra
Part III.C.
379 This would be the case when someone buys a gun with the specific intent of shooting someone else. Such cases exist, but they may be much less common than cases where
people buy a gun with legitimate intentions and only later decide to use it for a crime.
380 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 96Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1673; B
runson supra note 96, at 607 (arguing that these problems make it unlikely that a Pigouvian tax on guns would have more than a “margin[al]” or “incidental” effect on gun violence).
381 Masur & Posner, supra note 11, at 138.
382 See supra Part II.A.
383 See supra Part IV.C.
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monitor and enforce against and that are well-situated to take
cost-justified precautions.
Sometimes, these considerations will converge, pointing to a
single best locus of taxation. Consider the Pigouvian tax on fake
news. It would be prohibitively costly to directly tax every individual or group that produced a fake news story. Even if regulators tried, the worst offenders, like foreign agents, 384 would likely
be the least compliant. But most fake news is spread online, via
social media. 385 The tax should thus be imposed on companies like
Twitter and Facebook for two reasons. First, relatively few entities would need to be taxed, and they would be likely to comply
with the law. Second, social media companies are well-positioned
to develop solutions—including technological ones—for identifying and eradicating fake news stories. Already, small tech companies are developing machine learning techniques for detecting
fake news with a high degree of accuracy. 386 And Facebook has
announced its intention to label, but not remove, fake news stories on its platform. 387 It is no stretch to suppose that, spurred by
a Pigouvian incentive, such companies, which employ some of the
world’s best engineers, could develop even better solutions.
In other cases, administrability and efficiency considerations
could suggest taxing more than one entity. A tax on gun manufacturers might, for example, incentivize the invention of safer,
more advanced firearms. But because guns are durable, millions
already exist on the secondary market. 388 Thus, part of the
Pigouvian tax should be designed to reach existing owners. This
could be achieved in multiple ways. A government might impose
an annual tax directly on households that own firearms or a sales
tax every time a gun changed hands. Alternatively, it might tax
384F

385F

386F

387F

38F

384

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
386 See Indre Deksnyte, How AI Can Create and Detect Fake News, FORBES (Sept. 12,
2019), https://perma.cc/33G5-N496.
387 See Casey Newton, Facebook Will Label False Posts More Clearly as Part of an
Effort to Prevent 2020 Election Interference, THE VERGE (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/H778-8PEC. Facebook may believe that labeling is better than removal
because users are likely to encounter fake stories elsewhere too. But this equilibrium results from a collective action problem, wherein Facebook is regulating falsities and others
are not. Regulation overcomes that problem. Moreover, recent research suggests that
offering corrective information to people who have been affected by fake news makes them
even less likely to believe the truth. See generally John M. Carey, Victoria Chi, D.J. Flynn,
Brendan Nyhan & Thomas Zeitzoff, The Effects of Corrective Information About Disease
Epidemics and Outbreaks, 6 SCI. ADVANCES 7449 (2020).
388 See D. KIRK DAVIDSON, SELLING SIN: THE MARKETING OF SOCIALLY
UNACCEPTABLE PRODUCTS 57 (2003).
385
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a consumable complement of firearms, like ammunition. 389 The
optimal design might do all of these things in some proportion.
What about avoidance? Some scholars have suggested that,
especially for guns, individuals who cause the most social cost are
precisely those most likely to evade regulation. 390 Responsible
owners will pay their taxes, but criminals will not. 391 As a preliminary point, this objection applies principally to social costs arising from criminal shootings. It is less salient regarding accidental
shootings and suicides. And annual gun suicides alone outnumber
gun homicides nearly two to one. 392 Moreover, it relies on a picture
of people who commit gun crimes as possessing a deep-seated
criminal mentality—the television gangster whose business is
violence and whose murders are long premeditated. But if most
homicides instead reflect some combination of coincidence, inflamed passion, and tragic circumstance, the objection weakens.
Then, eventual criminal actors’ preferences at the time of taxation—and thus the time of decision about gun ownership—are
likely to be quite average. If most eventual perpetrators of homicide are ordinary people who live in dangerous surroundings, acquire cheap guns for protection, and have no standing commitments to homicide, then, at the time of taxation, they ought to
respond to incentives just like the rest of us.
As for committed tax avoiders, evasion is a potential issue for
any imaginable gun control regime, including total bans. Thus,
any substantive firearms regulation would need to be accompanied by measures designed to reduce evasion. Pigouvian taxes, in
particular, are amenable to such complementary measures. Rules
requiring seller licensing and universal background checks, while
unlikely on their own to substantially curb gun deaths, would improve tax enforcement. 393 So could high penalties for failure to pay
the Pigouvian gun tax. Indeed, we should expect such penalties
to actively incentivize compliance in a way not possible with traditional regulation. Under a ban, the regulated person has only
two high-cost options: forgo a gun and live without protection or
obtain one and suffer high expected regulatory penalties. But a
389F

390F

391F

392F

39F

389

See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 96, at 635.
See Fleischer, supra note 96, at 1677–78, 1677 n.17; Brunson, supra note 96, at 607.
391 See Fleischer, supra note 96, at 1677–78.
392 See Dylan Matthews, There are More Gun Suicides than Gun Homicides in America, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/C4S9-Z2KD.
393 See, e.g., Amy Sherman, 3 Things to Know About the ‘Gun Show Loophole’,
POLITIFACT (Jan. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/DA4L-UPWJ (describing deficiencies in licensing regimes).
390
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Pigouvian scheme offers a third, lower-cost option: pay a moderate tax and obtain protection. Evading the tax incurs higher expected regulatory costs but confers no marginal protection benefit. Thus, the rational choice for most—even those who would
evade a ban—will be to pay the tax. 394
394F

3. Tort liability and other equivalent designs.
Some readers may wonder why we need Pigouvian taxes
when we have tort liability. The two regimes share many features. Perhaps most importantly, both are, theoretically, sized to
match targeted social costs. They therefore ought to enjoy the
same advantages, both in effectiveness and constitutionality. But,
as currently implemented, tort systems fall short on both scores.
As for effectiveness, litigation is slow and expensive. In the
U.S. system, parties usually bear their own costs, such that it
makes no financial sense to pursue a claim with an expected value
smaller than the cost of litigation. 395 Small claims can sometimes
be aggregated in class actions. But substantive procedural rules
often bar classwide litigation by individuals who were harmed in
nonidentical ways. 396 Even if those procedural rules were modified, calculating actual damages as to every class member in every
case would remain a long and costly process. 397 Moreover, even if
tort claims were cheap and easy to bring, judgment-proofness
would often limit recoveries. All these factors conspire to produce
substantial underdeterrence, leaving social costs well above the
optimal level.
395F

396F

397F

394 One can certainly imagine considerations to the contrary. For example, if taxed
guns also had to be registered by serial number, perpetrators of gun crime might be easier
to identify. This cost, however, applies only to people who expect at tax time to need their
gun for a crime. Even then, it operates only as a marginal increase in total expected costs.
It will deter tax compliance only if that marginal increase exceeds the expected enforcement costs of tax noncompliance.
395 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class actions—and those the ones in which the rationale for
the procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each
class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”).
396 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609–10 (1997). But see generally
Peter N. Salib, Intelligent Class Actions, 100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with
author) (arguing that the use of artificial intelligence in class litigation could overcome
this hurdle).
397 But see Salib, supra note 396 (manuscript at 40) (explaining how artificial intelligence could be used to cheaply calculate individual damages).
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Tort regimes can also run afoul of constitutional strictures.
Consider the constitutional deficiencies the Sullivan Court identified in Alabama’s defamation law. 398 Juries can wildly overestimate damages, resulting in poor constitutional tailoring. 399 Furthermore, even accurate damage assessments for eggshell
plaintiffs can be large, perhaps burdening the risk-averse as they
engage in protected activity. 400
The problems above could be resolved by reforming liability
systems to look more like Pigouvian taxes. Instead of costly litigation resolved by unpredictable juries, plaintiffs might submit
grievances to administrative adjudicators. Those bodies could operate under streamlined procedural and evidentiary rules specialized to the kinds of claims they resolved. They could be staffed by
experts who relied on standard methods for computing damages.
These reforms would help to solve the problems of litigation
expense and inaccurate damages awards. But they would leave
untouched problems of judgment-proofness and risk aversion.
Both might be solved by mandating liability insurance. 401 With
mandatory insurance in place, costs are imposed in the amount of
predicted harm, rather than in the amount of actual harm. This
would largely eliminate the judgment-proofness problem and
smooth out unpredictable variations in damages, reducing risk.
In such a system, sophisticated insurers, anticipating predictable
damages awards imposed by experts, would likely settle the vast
majority of cases. This would further reduce litigation costs.
A tort system thus reformed would compare well with
Pigouvian taxes, both in terms of efficiency and constitutionality.
This is largely because, in the end, the two systems are quite similar. In both, government experts measure social costs and standardize prices for costly activity. The main difference between the
two regimes would be that, when instances of harm need to be
predicted ex ante, insurers’ market incentives might cause them
to outperform governments. On the other hand, insurers might
not be willing to cover everyone, such that the highest-risk individuals would be excluded from the ex ante payment system. Considerations like these should rightly inform policy design choices.
398F

39F

40F

401F

398
399
400
401

guns).

See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See, e.g., Galle & Mungan, supra note 96, at 380 (proposing such a scheme for
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One can imagine other variations on regulatory design that
share the important features elucidated here. Cap-and-trade systems can be designed to mimic Pigouvian taxes. The trick is to
increase the supply of permits for an activity until their price
mimics the optimal Pigouvian tax rate. 402 Insofar as individual
jurisdictions prefer such variations on the core proposal presented here, this Article raises no objection.
402F

B.

Normative Challenges

The foregoing parts argue that Pigouvian taxes on protected
activities would, at least in some important cases, be both constitutional and effective at reducing legitimate social costs. The upshot is that, if we wanted to, we could regulate constitutionally
protected activities with Pigouvian taxes. But should we? Such
regulation raises important normative concerns. This Section explores them. Along the way, it shows how Pigouvian thinking illuminates normative problems for any scheme of regulating constitutionally protected activity. Such thinking likewise suggests
avenues for doctrinal reform that would improve protections—especially for the poor—under any regulatory regime.
1. Distributional effects.
Pigouvian taxes on constitutionally protected activity would
have distributional effects. Money has diminishing marginal utility. 403 Thus, every dollar of tax liability for owning a gun or speaking online or obtaining an abortion hurts the poor more than the
rich. At some price, people of sufficiently limited means simply
will not be able to engage in the protected activity at all. Imagine
if the properly sized, constitutionally adequate Pigouvian tax on
gun ownership turned out to be many thousands of dollars per
year. Then, low-income individuals and families would be functionally barred from partaking of any of the benefits the Second
Amendment guarantees. Middle-class families might still be able
to own a firearm for self-defense, perhaps by making other sacrifices. Billionaires could own whole arsenals and never consciously
feel the tax’s effect. In such a world, the rich have nearly unlimited access to the benefits the Constitution protects, while the
poor have none.
403F

402
403

Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 374, at 13.
See ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 26–27 (1944).
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Consider, however, that every valid regulation of constitutionally protected activity, including traditional ones, raises the
cost of the activity. Sometimes these costs are explicit. Zoning restrictions on theaters make protected speech more expensive, yet
they can be constitutionally imposed. 404 Constitutionally valid
tort penalties for negligent shootings or health regulations for
abortion providers likewise raise the price tag for engaging in protected activity.
Other times, regulations raise the price of protected activity
implicitly by increasing the time or effort required. Such hidden
price hikes can have the same disparate effect on the poor, whose
nonmonetary and monetary resources are both strained. 405 Recall
that Casey actually allows some regulations that impose a burden
on obtaining an abortion. 406 If, for example, a well-tailored safety
regulation causes some clinics to close, that increases the travel
necessary for some women to obtain abortions. Low-income
women, with less free time, less flexible jobs, and less support at
home, will be the most affected. This is not a mere theoretical
possibility. There are a dozen states that presently have three or
fewer abortion clinics. 407 One can tell the same story about permitting requirements for demonstrations, waiting periods for gun
purchases, and numerous other laws.
The distributional problem is thus pervasive. Understanding
it tells us something about regulation via Pigouvian tax. But it
tells us much the same about all regulation of protected activity.
All such regulations involve tradeoffs between protected benefits
and social costs. And the detriment to protected benefits functions
as an increase in the price of obtaining that benefit. Increases in
price—implicit or explicit, monetary or in-kind—hurt the poor
more than the rich.
Thinking of constitutional regulation in economic terms—as
Pigouvian taxes require—brings this problem to the fore. It allows us to see clearly how people of different means are disparately impacted by the tradeoffs that our constitutional law already makes. But, hopefully, it also helps us to think more clearly
about the potential solutions.
40F

405F

406F

407F

404

See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54–55 (1986).
Consider that money can buy time, as when the wealthy outsource time-consuming
activities like childcare and housekeeping.
406 See supra Part IV.D.
407 See supra note 347.
405
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To begin, the Constitution already contains some measures
for mitigating the distributional problem, either from traditional
or Pigouvian regulations. The legitimacy requirement functions as
a first line of defense against regulations that could swallow protected benefits whole. Imagine if a protected activity were to have
some widespread but trivial effect on a huge number of people—for
example, the above-posited mild headaches from radio waves. 408
Lawmakers might choose to regulate that effect, and the resulting implicit price increase could be substantial, even from a welltailored law. But if that were the law’s effect, a heightened legitimacy requirement would apply. 409 Then, the Constitution would
demand at least a moderately important regulatory goal, and preventing mild headaches would presumably not suffice. 410 This protection is more substantial than it might first seem, given that
essentially any effect of activity might constitute a social cost in
some regulator’s mind. 411 The legitimacy requirement thus heads
off innumerable significant distributional burdens.
Legitimacy tests, however, cannot solve all distributional
problems. It is not difficult to imagine regulations substantially
raising the costs of protected activity while satisfying both the legitimacy and tailoring requirements. Some social costs from protected activities are both large and able to pass a high legitimacy
threshold. The major harms from gun ownership may fall into
this category. As discussed above, the average marginal social
cost of one household with a gun may be over $1,000 per year. 412
Furthermore, consider that, as a formal matter, the courts
generally review only the laws before them for constitutionality.
Heightened legitimacy and tailoring requirements are thus triggered only when the law under review is particularly odious or
burdensome on protected benefits. It is therefore possible to imagine a mosaic of laws, enacted over time, each of which is moderately tailored to a moderately important social cost. The laws
might pass constitutional muster individually, but if considered
together, they would trigger strict scrutiny and be struck down.
In fact, that very thing may be happening now in states with just
408F

409F

410F

41F

412F

408

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
410 As outlined above, the legitimacy requirement is fundamentally qualitative. Preventing a murder is more legitimate than preventing millions and millions of paper cuts,
even if it turns out that the aggregate amount society would pay for both is equal. See
supra Part III.C.
411 See supra notes 210–11.
412 See supra Part IV.C.
409
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a few abortion providers. Those legislatures may have enacted a
series of health-related regulations, each of which passes a low
legitimacy and tailoring threshold on its own. But if enacted and
examined together, the laws would have triggered more stringent
review, and they would have been struck down. 413
Existing constitutional rules protecting individual activity
thus allow at least some burdensome regulations that will
strongly impact the poor. What is there to say about this? There
are two options, and the Supreme Court has seemed to say both,
sometimes in a single case. One response is to say that the situation is just too bad. The Constitution does not guarantee the right
to partake of protected benefits cheaply, and it certainly does not
require society to subsidize those benefits, including by absorbing
associated costs. The Court said something similar in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 414 denying that there was a constitutional right to engage in protected speech “at bargain prices.” 415
The other response is to say that the Constitution guarantees
everyone some minimum quantum of protected benefits, regardless of wealth. Put another way, maybe the constitution places a
cap on the maximum burden a regulation may impose, regardless
of legitimacy and tailoring. 416 This principle appears occasionally
in the case law. Cases analyzing time, place, and manner restrictions on speech—including, again, City of Renton—have required such laws to leave available sufficient “alternative avenues
of communication.” 417 A rule like that could be used more broadly
to strike down laws that, while tailored to legitimate social costs,
make constitutional benefits substantially unattainable. Moreover, whether alternative avenues remain available depends on,
among other things, regulations other than the one under review. 418 The rule might thus be used to target constellations of
413F

41F

415F

416F

417F

418F

413 Here, unlike in Whole Woman’s Health, constitutional strictures may be failing to
bar legislators from doing by subterfuge what they could not accomplish in the open. See
supra Part IV.D.
414 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
415 Id. at 54.
416 See generally Blocher, supra note 102.
417 City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. Consider also, from another constitutional context,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956), which outlawed imposing certain court fees
on indigent parties.
418 In City of Renton, for example, the total regulatory landscape left “some 520 acres,
or more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult theater
sites.” 475 U.S. at 53. Total land available is a consequence not only of a zoning regulation
under review, but also of a city’s other land use laws.
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regulations that, taken together, put protected benefits out of
many people’s reach.
In the end, the “no bargain prices” principle carried City of
Renton. The Court upheld the regulation, despite the “alternative
avenues” rule, on the theory that that “[t]he inquiry for First
Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact.” 419
But it is hard to see why. As just discussed, all regulations impose
costs. It should not matter to an alternative avenues–style test
whether the laws foreclose alternatives directly, or indirectly via
insurmountable increases in price or effort. Perhaps, then, the
right reading of the “alternative avenues” test, as it exists today,
is as guaranteeing an opportunity to speak not for everyone, but
just for someone. So long as a regulation leaves space for some
people to air their views, it survives review. If that is the rule, the
“some people” in question will generally be the rich.
Nevertheless, we could update our constitutional rules to recognize that everyone, including the poor, has a right to some minimum quantum of each protected benefit. Courts could apply
something like a beefed up version of the “alternative avenues”
test across doctrinal areas. When reviewing a particular law,
courts would examine the entire regulatory landscape. They
would ask whether—regardless of the law’s legitimacy and tailoring—it left available to the poorest members of society some minimum ability to partake of constitutional goods. If not, the law
would be invalidated, at least until legislators revised some portion of the relevant regulatory scheme to provide for the requisite
minimums.
Implementing such a test would not be easy. It would require
courts to decide, through the adversarial process, how innumerable laws interacted to affect the poor. It would also require them
to determine, as to each constitutional right, what qualifies as an
acceptable minimum quantum of benefits. This task, while difficult, is not entirely alien to constitutional law. The Sixth Amendment, for example, guarantees a right to an attorney in criminal
cases. 420 And the Supreme Court has held that, while this does
not mean a free attorney in every case, governments must appoint
counsel for those who cannot afford it. 421 What constitutes minimally competent, and thus constitutionally sufficient, counsel is
419F

420F

421F

419 Id. at 54 (quoting Young v. Am. Movie Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
420 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
421 See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661 (2002).
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a complex and oft-litigated question. 422 The Constitution similarly
guarantees some minimum access to the courts, even for those
who cannot pay ministerial fees. 423
Such a minimum-benefits rule would essentially require lawmakers to adjust existing networks of regulations of protected activities to make them progressive. This could be accomplished, for
example, with regulatory waivers for the indigent or targeted subsidies for low-income households. 424
The analysis of distributional effects so far shows that they
are an important problem for both Pigouvian and traditional regulations on constitutionally protected activity. But are they a bigger problem for one? The answer depends first on how bad things
are now, under our regime of traditional rules. It depends second
on the predicted marginal effect of substituting traditional rules
with Pigouvian taxes.
There is some reason to think that the distributional problems under the current regime are significant. As discussed
above, existing constitutional rules can deal with them only occasionally and indirectly. Thus unregulated, the distributional effects of current regulations may well be substantial.
If that is right, would a transition to Pigouvian regulation
make the problem better or worse? The problem might get better
insofar as Pigouvian taxes can more efficiently regulate social
costs than can traditional regulations. Recall that many laws affecting constitutional rights need maintain only a moderate proportionality between social costs avoided and constitutional benefits reduced. Therefore, many current laws probably impose
bigger constitutional burdens than are necessary to achieve the
desired reduction in costs. Replacing those with Pigouvian taxes
would reduce constitutional burdens and thus price out fewer
people from protected benefits.
On the other hand, this Article contends that a transition to
Pigouvian taxation would enable regulation of previously unregulable activity. So long as those new regulations target social
42F

423F

42F

422

See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).
See generally Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
424 Such reforms would cut both ways, politically speaking. The idea of abortion
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costs worth reducing, that is a good thing from a welfarist perspective. But more regulation means higher costs. Even if it reduces important harms, additional regulation initially exacerbates distributional effects.
It is possible, though, that moving toward regulation via
Pigouvian tax would make our pervasive distributional problems
publicly salient. Price increases from Pigouvian taxes are transparent, unlike the increases from current rules. And if the public,
legislatures, or the courts began to take the problem seriously,
perhaps rules would arise protecting minimum access to constitutional benefits. Such rules would also be easier to implement in
a world where constitutional regulation was primarily Pigouvian.
The regulatory costs from Pigouvian taxes are easy to determine
and offset. Thus, a shift toward Pigouvian regulation might enable long-run reductions in distributional problems, as compared
with our current baseline.
One final note on distribution: The distributional consequences of regulation apply far beyond the contexts discussed
here. All regulations—even responsible food, environmental, or
highway safety rules—can raise prices. And those price increases
can put basic goods, both constitutional and otherwise, beyond
the reach of the poorest citizens. The root of these most severe
distributional problems, then, is poverty. Thus, the best way to
remedy them is not to tinker with every law, making it marginally
less burdensome on the very poor. It is to enact aggressive, freestanding redistributive programs that help create a society in
which there are no very poor.
2. The expressive function of traditional regulations.
Another normative concern about Pigouvian taxes might be
that they cannot perform all the functions of traditional regulations. In particular, one might wonder whether bans, permitting
schemes, or other command-and-control rules have expressive
content that Pigouvian taxes lack. 425 There are several reasons to
think that little expressive power would be lost by adopting the
proposals advocated here.
425F

425 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
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This Article is about regulating activity that has traditionally
been difficult to regulate. In this context, the choice is not between
traditional regulation and Pigouvian taxes. Rather, it is between
Pigouvian taxes and little or no regulation. Thus, even if Pigouvian
taxes lack any expressive quality whatsoever, no expression is
lost by using them if no other option exists.
What about situations where lawmakers could choose either
Pigouvian taxation or traditional regulation? One major reason to
care about the law’s expressive function is that it may influence
behavior. It can do so by shaping social norms 426 or by providing
information relevant to decision-making. 427 Perhaps a severe restriction on handguns causes society to look down on those who
buy them, thus imposing a “social tax” on their purchase. 428 Or
maybe such a law conveys information to gun owners about the
risks from firearms to themselves or others.
A Pigouvian tax can do both things. If social norms are implicit taxes, Pigouvian taxes are just explicit versions of the same
thing. As for laws’ information-transmitting role, economists
have long held that prices—which Pigouvian taxes raise—are a
tool for aggregating and transmitting information. 429 Raising a
price by the Pigouvian rate simply incorporates information about
social costs into that price. This effect can be made more salient by
flagging the existence and purpose of a given Pigouvian tax. 430
Finally, it is not clear what the law should express when regulating constitutionally protected activity. Owning a gun or getting an abortion is not like committing a murder, which everyone
agrees is bad and should be condemned. Some approve of these
protected activities; others do not. And the Constitution enshrines
a right to engage in them, absent some important countervailing
harm. Should the law then turn social norms against protected
activity on account of the harm it causes? Or should it turn them
in favor of it, so that people may more readily partake of constitutional goods? The answer is not obvious. Perhaps then, in this
realm, the law ought to be silent, or at least speak only cautiously.
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429 See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519 (1945).
430 See Chetty et al., supra note 85, at 1170–71.
427

2021]

The Pigouvian Constitution

1155

CONCLUSION
Courts, lawmakers, and society as a whole have long recognized that constitutionally protected activity is not all upside.
Certainly, some of the benefits reaped from such activities are vitally important—important enough to be safeguarded by the “supreme law of the land.” 431 But there are harms, too, some of which
are likewise of great importance to lawmakers and their constituents. And the very supreme law that protects the benefits has
also often made those harms difficult or impossible to control.
Pigouvian taxation offers a regulatory structure that can do what
few others can. In important cases, Pigouvian taxes can effectively reduce the most important social costs from protected activity, while maintaining the Constitution’s delicate balance between regulation and rights. Pigouvian taxation thus represents
a valuable new regulatory tool in areas historically fraught with
constitutional pitfalls. Indeed, absent sweeping constitutional
change, it may be the only means available for meaningfully attacking modern problems like rising gun death rates or the
scourge of online fake news.
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